Hidden variables in quantum mechanics: Generic models, set-theoretic
  forcing, and the emergence of probability by Van Wesep, Robert A.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
05
06
04
0v
2 
 7
 Ju
n 
20
05
1 Introduction
In the companion paper[13] to this we discuss two approaches to the quan-
tum theory of observation: the Copenhagen interpretation and the so-called
many-worlds interpretation. The position of that paper may be paraphrased
as follows: The Copenhagen interpretation correctly describes the experience
of observation of quantum systems but is untenable as a description of real-
ity; whereas the many-worlds “interpretation” is not really an interpretation
of quantum mechanics but is simply the application of standard quantum
theory to the compound system consisting of the observed and the observer,
both considered as physical systems. Its tenability as a description of reality
requires that it yield the experience of observation described by the Copen-
hagen interpretation, which is that of a stochastic process with probabilities
given by the squared norm. The principal result of [13] is that it does.
The present paper addresses a third approach to modeling quantum reality:
the hidden-variables program, which proposes to account for the apparent
nondeterministic nature of quantum measurement by supposing that physical
states have properties that are not “observable” in the ordinary sense. These
non-observable attributes are the hidden variables for which the program is
named, and it is supposed that they uniquely determine the outcome of any
observation.
The principal objects of interest in [13] are propositional algebras, which are
boolean algebras of commuting quantum propositions, and the present work
begins with an examination of the hidden-variables program for such alge-
bras. In Section 3 it is shown that hidden-variables models in this setting
are generic in the set-theoretic sense, and—as with the so-called many-worlds
interpretation—they give the appearance of randomness, with the usual role of
the squared norm as probability, while being themselves entirely deterministic.
Section 4 presents the theory of genericity per se, providing a more compre-
hensive setting for the results of the preceding section and a more flexible tool
for the work of Section 5, which extends the hidden-variables construction to
suitable systems of possibly noncommuting propositions. It follows from fa-
miliar no-hidden-variables theorems that this extension cannot be universal,
but a natural sufficient condition is given for its existence. A full appreciation
of the significance of genericity is only possible with some understanding of
mathematical logic and models of set theory, and a brief sketch of this theory is
given in Section 6 for the interested reader. As in [13], it will be convenient to
employ certain elementary conventions of modern set theory throughout this
discussion; some of these are introduced in [13], and the rest are summarized
in the appendix to the present paper. Familiarity with [13] is assumed. As in
[13], theorems of a general nature are labeled ‘Proposition’; proofs of these
are straightforward or readily available in the existing literature, but some are
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nevertheless presented here for their pedagogic value. Theorems specific to the
argument of this paper are labeled ‘Theorem’.
2 Limitations on the hidden-variables program
At its most ambitious the hidden-variables program proposes that the true
state of a system is such it has a definite value—1 or 0—for any quantum
proposition. It is well known that if the dimension of the statevector space for
the system is greater than 2 then this is impossible, so it is necessary from
the outset to restrict our attention to specific sets of propositions, for which
purpose we introduce the notion of a propositional system. Recall (Section II
of [13]) that the meet and join of propositions are defined iff they commute
with one another, in which case meet is intersection and join is orthogonal
complement of intersection of orthogonal complements.
Definition 1 A propositional system (PS) on a Hilbert space V is a nonempty
set R of propositions that is closed under complementation and binary meet
(equivalently, finitary meet or join).
A boolean subsystem of R is a subset of R that is a propositional algebra
(PA)—in other words, a subsystem of commuting elements.
R is complete iff it is also closed under general meet.
The set of all propositions for a Hilbert space V is of course a complete PS,
and the intersection of any collection of complete PSs is a complete PS. Given
any PS R we define R, the completion of R, to be the smallest complete PS
that includes R, which is the intersection of all complete PSs that include R.
We will call the hypothetical states called for by the hidden-variables program
pseudoclassical. Specifically, a pseudoclassical state Ψ for a PS R has a definite
value—either 1 or 0—for each proposition P ∈ R. We use ‘true’ and ‘yes’
interchangeably with 1, and ‘false’ and ‘no’ interchangeably with 0. For a
given Ψ and P,Q ∈ R,
(1) if P is true of Ψ and P ≤ Q then Q is true of Ψ;
(2) if P and Q commute and P and Q are true of Ψ then P ∧Q is true of Ψ.
A proof of the inconsistency of these conditions for a given PS or family of PSs
is called a no-hidden-variables (NHV) theorem, and of these a number exist,
the first having been given by von Neumann[14]. 1 All rely on the presence of
1 Note that while Conditions 1 and 2 are sufficient for the typical NHV theorem,
they do not necessarily fully express the hidden-variables premise.
2
noncommuting propositions in R, for the simple reason that Conditions 1 and
2 can always be satisfied if R is boolean.
In the hidden-variables literature, dependence of the value of an observable on
the particular interaction by which it is measured, as represented by the set of
all (necessarily commuting) observables measured by that interaction, is called
contextuality. To assert that Ψ is pseudoclassical for a nonboolean PS, there-
fore, is to assert some degree of noncontextuality. Some of the interest in NHV
theorems has to do with the sort of noncontextuality they assume. Bell’s first
NHV theorem[1], for example, assumes only that degree of noncontextuality
that follows from the principle of locality, which states that the result of an
observation localized in space does not depend on what other observations are
considered along with it as long as the latter are localized to regions of space
sufficiently remote from the first (see [10] for a nice presentation of related
NHV results).
Positive results have received relatively little attention in the hidden-variables
literature, and it is this territory that we explore in this paper. In the NHV
literature the PAs P that occur (as boolean subsystems of the nonboolean
PSs of interest) are typically finite, and for these the positive result is trivial:
the simultaneous eigenstates of all P ∈ P are the pseudoclassical states for P.
The same holds for any atomic algebra. 2 If P is not atomic then at least some
pseudoclassical states are not ordinary quantum states, and if P is atomless—
as it is in cases of interest for the purposes of this paper—then pseudoclassical
states cannot be ordinary quantum states.
To take a familiar example, suppose A is a continuous quantum observable, say
the x-coordinate of a particle at a given time. Let B be the boolean algebra of
Borel subsets of R, which are obtained from intervals by repeated applications
of the operations of complementation and countable union and intersection.
For X ∈ B, let χX be the characteristic function of X , so that
χX(x) =


1 if x ∈ X
0 if x /∈ X.
Then χX(A) is a well defined selfadjoint operator, which represents the quan-
tum proposition that the x-coordinate of the particle at the given time is in X .
Let A be the algebra of propositions χX(A) for X ∈ B. These are quantum
propositions in the ordinary sense: true of some states, false of others, and
indeterminate for the rest. Concerning a pseudoclassical state, however, each
2 P is atomic iff every P ∈ P is the join of the atoms below it, an atom in P
being a minimal nonzero element of P. The 1-eigenstates of the atoms are the
pseudoclassical states.
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of these is true or false. It will follow from the analysis presented below that
a pseudoclassical state for A has a precise numerical value for A, but that
this value is random in the sense of [12], so that, for example, it is not in any
definable set of real numbers with ordinary Lebesgue measure 0; it is not, for
example, rational.
3 Genericity
3.1 The necessity of genericity
We begin by considering a boolean algebra P of propositions, i.e., a proposi-
tional algebra, in a Hilbert space V of statevectors of a physical system S, and
we suppose that every proposition in P corresponds to a physical observable.
Suppose Ψ is a pseudoclassical state. Let FΨ = FΨ,P be the set of propositions
in P true of Ψ. By virtue of Conditions 1 and 2, FΨ is a filter on P. Since
Ψ has a definite value for each P ∈ P, FΨ is an ultrafilter. Let HP be the
set of all FΨ where Ψ is pseudoclassical. We will call these the pseudoclassical
filters. The characterization of HP is central to the hidden-variables program.
The basic hidden-variables premise is that the ordinary quantum propositions
are all we can know of pseudoclassical states, or, equivalently, regarded as
questions are all we can pose of pseudoclassical states. To put it the other way
round, any question that may be posed of a pseudoclassical state Ψ vis-a`-vis
P is equivalent to ‘is P true of Ψ?’ for some proposition P ∈ P. This naturally
entails some restriction on the class of posable questions under consideration.
The mathematical equivalent of ‘is P true of Ψ?’ is
1 ‘P ∈ FΨ?’.
Since a pseudoclassical state Ψ determines an ultrafilter FΨ, any set C of
ultrafilters on P could correspond a priori to a question concerning a pseu-
doclassical state, viz., the question
2 ‘FΨ ∈ C?’.
A hidden-variables model will in general consider only some of these as actually
posable.
We will show that pseudoclassical states must correspond to generic filters and
that generic filters in turn have all the properties required of pseudoclassical
states in a hidden-variables model, so that they constitute the unique real-
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ization of the hidden-variables program in this setting. We do this by stating
several premises that a hidden-variables model should fulfill, from which we
draw several inferences, concluding with the genericity property. We assume
familiarity with the concepts covered in the appendix.
Let C be the set of sets of ultrafilters onP that correspond to posable questions
of the form 2 in a given hidden-variables model.
Premise 1 The basic hidden-variables premise restricts C and H = HP rel-
ative to P by the requirement that
(∀C ∈ C)(∃P ∈ P)(∀F ∈ H)(P ∈ F ⇐⇒ F ∈ C). (1)
Definition 2 In general, if P is a BA, let UP be the set of all ultrafilters on
P. For any S ⊆ |P|, let US = U
P
S be the set of ultrafilters on P containing a
member of S. For P ∈ P, let UP = U{P}.
The sets UPP form a base for a topology on U
P. The open sets are arbitrary
unions of these, i.e., sets of the form UPS .
We can certainly pose the negations, conjunctions, and disjunctions of posable
questions, so
Premise 2 C is closed under finitary boolean operations.
We have assumed that every P ∈ P is a posable question, so
Premise 3 for every P ∈ P, UP ∈ C.
The fundamental existence premise for the hidden-variables program is that
every physical proposition that can be true for an ordinary quantum state is
true for some pseudoclassical state; hence,
Premise 4 for every P ∈ P−, for some F ∈ H, P ∈ F .
The following inferences may be drawn from Premises 1–4.
Inference 1 P in (1) is uniquely determined by C.
PROOF. Suppose P and P ′ both work for a given C, and P 6= P ′. Then
either P − P ′ or P ′ − P is nonzero. Without loss of generality we suppose
P − P ′ 6= 0. Premise 3 implies that for some F ∈ H, (P − P ′) ∈ F , so P ∈ F
and P ′ /∈ F , which contradicts the hypothesis that both P and P ′ satisfy (1)
for C. ✷
Definition 3 We define [[C]] = [[C]]P to be that P ∈ P that satisfies (1) for
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C. We call [[C]] the boolean value of C or the truth value of C, thinking of C
as a unary predicate applied to members of H.
Inference 2 If C and C ′ are in C then
∼C,C ∪ C ′, C ∩ C ′ ∈ C, (2)
[[∼C]] = ∼[[C]], (3)
[[C ∪ C ′]] = [[C]] ∨ [[C ′]], (4)
[[C ∩ C ′]] = [[C]] ∧ [[C ′]], (5)
and C ⊆ C ′=⇒ [[C]] ≤ [[C ′]]. (6)
PROOF. (2) is just Premise 2. To prove (3) we observe that for all F ∈ H,
[[∼C]] ∈ F ⇐⇒ F ∈ ∼C ⇐⇒ F /∈ C ⇐⇒ [[C]] /∈ F.
It follows from Premise 4 that [[∼C]] ∨ [[C]] = 1 and [[∼C]] ∧ [[C]] = 0, i.e., that
[[∼C]] = ∼[[C]], as claimed.
To prove (4) we observe that for all F ∈ H
[[C ∪ C ′]] ∈ F ⇐⇒ F ∈ (C ∪ C ′)
⇐⇒ (F ∈ C or F ∈ C ′)
⇐⇒ ([[C]] ∈ F or [[C ′]] ∈ F ).
As before, Premise 4 yields the desired conclusion.
(5) follows from (3) and (4), and (6) follows from the fact that for any P, P ′ ∈
P, P ≤ P ′ ⇐⇒ P ∧ P ′ = P by definition. ✷
(4) is only a special case of the following inference, which deals with possibly
infinite unions (and by implication intersections) of members of C and is proved
similarly.
Inference 3 Suppose C′ ⊆ C and
⋃
C′ ∈ C. Then [[
⋃
C′]] =
∨
{[[C]] | C ∈ C′}.
This is important for the hidden-variables program if it is to explain the statis-
tics of observation in quantum mechanics. In particular, the set
Cq =
⋂
M>0
⋃
N∈ω
⋂
n>N
⋃
σ∈n2
|q− 1
n
n−1∑
m=0
σ(m)|< 1
M
⋂
m<n
U(∼)1−σ(m)Pm (7)
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plays a critical role in this regard, where 〈Pn | n ∈ ω〉 is a sequence of pro-
jections, just as the corresponding set Lq ⊆
ω2 and projection P (Lq) do in
[13].
Given (1), Inference 3 implies that if
⋃
C′ ∈ C and S = {[[C]] | C ∈ C′} then
for all F ∈ H,
∨
S ∈ F ⇐⇒ (∃P ∈ S)P ∈ F . Note that the ⇐=-direction
follows from the fact that F , being a filter, is closed upward. The =⇒-direction
imposes an additional requirement on F . When in Section 3.2 we reverse the
current chain of inference it will be convenient to have a statement of this
requirement that does not explicitly presume that
∨
S exists in P. Although
we are currently interested only in boolean algebras, we will introduce the
relevant notion (that of genericity) in the more general context of partial
orders, as this is the most natural setting for the concept, and we will use it in
this way later on. 3 For technical reasons it will be convenient for us to work
with prefilters—i.e., directed sets—rather than exclusively with filters.
Definition 4 Suppose P is a PO and S is a class. A prefilter D on P is S-
generic iff for all S ∈ S, if S ⊆ |P| then there exists p ∈ D such that p ∈ S or
p is incompatible with all elements of S. We are often particularly concerned
with maximal prefilters (which are necessarily filters), and we let GS,P
def
= the
set of maximal S-generic filters on P.
If P is a BA, the above definitions apply with P− for P. For terminologic
convenience later on we have not required that all members of S be subsets of
|P|, although we are only concerned with those that are. Note that a prefilter
D is S-generic iff the filter ⌊D⌋ it generates is S-generic.
It should be noted that ‘generic’ is usually defined with reference to dense
sets, as follows.
Definition 5 Suppose P is a PO. A subset S of |P| is dense iff any condition
in |P| has an extension in S. A prefilter D is S-generic according to this
definition iff D meets every dense set in S.
3 As we will see, any partial order corresponds to a boolean algebra in a way
that is quite natural in the context of genericity, and the theory of generic filters
in POs is not essentially more general than the theory restricted to BAs. (This
is a different correspondence than that of a BA to the partial order defined by
P ≤ Q ⇐⇒ P ∧ Q = P .) When we come to deal with propositional systems,
however, the relevant PO will be easier to work with than the associated BA, which
is one step more abstract than the partial order, which itself is a step more abstract
than the initial propositional system. It should be noted that the BAs that arise
in this way are only tenuously related to the propositional algebras with which we
have dealt so far, and dealing with the PO is a way of avoiding confusion that might
otherwise result from the simultaneous use of two very different algebras.
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For technical reasons Def. 4 is preferable for this discussion.
Note that for any S ⊆ |P|, the set
S ′ = {p ∈ |P| | (∃q ∈ S) p ≤ q or (∀q ∈ S) p|q} (8)
is dense, so for any class S and any filter D, D is S-generic in the sense
of Def. 4 iff D is S ′-generic in the usual sense, where S ′ = {S ′ | S ∈ S}.
(Remember that filters are by definition closed upward.)
Inference 4 Let S consist of all sets of the form
{[[C]] | C ∈ C′},
where C′ ⊆ C and
⋃
C′ ∈ C. Then every F ∈ H is S-generic.
PROOF. Suppose C′ ⊆ C and
⋃
C′ ∈ C, and let S = {[[C]] | C ∈ C′}. If
F ∈
⋃
C′ then F ∈ C for some C ∈ C′, whence F contains [[C]] ∈ S. If
F ∈ ∼
⋃
C′ then [[∼
⋃
C′]] ∈ F . But [[∼
⋃
C′]] = ∼[[
⋃
C′]] = ∼
∨
S, which is
incompatible with all members of S. ✷
Note that if C′ = {UP} for some P ∈ P, then
⋃
C′ = UP ∈ C. Since [[UP ]] = P ,
every F ∈ H is {P}-generic, so either P ∈ F or ∼P ∈ F . Thus, even if we had
not stipulated at the outset that H consists of ultrafilters, this would follow
from Premises 1–4.
3.2 The sufficiency of genericity for propositional algebras
3.2.1 The existence of generic filters
Inference 4 tells us that the filters that arise naturally in any hidden-variables
model are generic to the extent that the class C of “posable questions” is
closed under unions (equivalently, intersections). In this section we will show
conversely that generic filters have all the properties required of pseudoclassi-
cal states, including the familiar statistical properties of quantum observation.
Hence generic filters on PAs constitute the unique realization of the hidden-
variables program for propositional algebras.
The following observations give some information about the existence of S-
generic filters.
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Proposition 1 Suppose P is a PO and S is a countable class. Then for any
condition p there is an S-generic filter F on P that contains p. By Prop. 23,
F may be taken to be maximal.
PROOF. Let S = {Sn | n ∈ ω}. Construct a descending sequence 〈pn | n ∈
ω〉 as follows. Let p0 = p and for each n ∈ ω, if pn is compatible with some
q ∈ Sn let pn+1 be some common extension of pn and some such q, otherwise
let pn+1 = pn. Let F = {p ∈ |P| | (∃n ∈ ω)pn ≤ p}. Clearly F is as desired. ✷
The existence of S-generic filters for uncountable S is a matter of great interest
in set theory, and we will see why—or rather how—this is in due course. For
now we simply point out that if every member of P has incompatible extensions
and F is a filter on P then F is not {|P| \F}-generic, so there are no S-generic
filters if S is the set of all subsets of |P|.
In general, we may anticipate some difficulty in attempting to construct S-
generic filters for uncountable classes S, although Proposition 23 shows that
this can be done for some interesting uncountable classes (viz., {{p} | p ∈ |P|}
for uncountable POs P). Let us defer this issue for the moment while we show
that generic filters do indeed have the properties of pseudoclassical states as
promised above.
3.2.2 Boolean expressions
It is useful to separate the notion of boolean value from the issue of existence
of generic filters, which we do by working with boolean expressions. Boolean
expressions (BEs) are constructed from primitive expressions using comple-
mentation, join, and meet. (Technically, one defines boolean expression of rank
α for α ∈ Ω, the class of ordinals, by ∈-recursion, as described in Sec. 6.2.
Def. 6 is subsumed in this definition.) It is convenient to suppose that the
primitive expressions in any instance are indexed by a set in some standard
way. If I is the index set, we use ‘ǫi’ to indicate the i
th primitive expression
for i ∈ I. We use ‘∼’, ‘ǫι = {f ∈ I2 | f(i) = 1}’, and ‘
∧
’ to indicate the opera-
tions that form the complement, join, and meet, respectively. These are unary
operations, with ∼ applying to expressions, and
∨
and
∧
applying to sets of
expressions. The only requirement we impose on ǫ·, ∼·,
∨
· and
∧
· is that they
be one-one with disjoint images, so that every expression E is uniquely of one
of the forms ǫi, ∼E ′,
∨
E , or
∧
E for some i ∈ I, some expression E ′, or some
set E of expressions. A BE whose primitive expressions are indexed by a set
I is said to be I-ary. For example, ∼ǫ0,
∨
{∼ǫ0, ǫ1}, and
∧
m∈ω
∨
n∈ωǫ2m3n are
examples of ω-ary BEs.
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Definition 6 The rank ρ(E) and the set Eˆ of subexpressions of a boolean
expression E are defined recursively.
(1) If E is primitive then ρ(E) = 0 and Eˆ = {E}.
(2) If E = ∼E ′ then ρ(E) = ρ(E ′) + 1 and Eˆ = {E} ∪ Eˆ ′.
(3) If E =
∨
E or
∧
E then ρ(E) = supE′∈E(ρ(E
′) + 1), and Eˆ = {E} ∪⋃
E′∈E Eˆ
′.
What we have said so far about ∼,
∨
, and
∧
has simply defined an abstract
structure. The following definition confers meaning on these operations.
Definition 7 Suppose I is a class, A is a complete boolean algebra, and ι :
I → |A|. The following conditions uniquely determine an |A|-valued function
[[·]]ι on the class BI of I-ary boolean expressions.
[[ǫi]]
ι= ι(i)
[[∼E]]ι=∼[[E]]ι
[[
∨
E ]]ι=
∨
{[[E]]ι | E ∈ E}
[[
∧
E ]]ι=
∧
{[[E]]ι | E ∈ E}.
An A-valuation or A-interpretation of BI is any function [[·]]ι obtained in this
way. We will also refer to ι itself as an interpretation.
If A is a propositional algebra we refer to A-interpretations as propositional
interpretations. Note that since boolean operations have a natural interpre-
tation for (commuting) propositions, any proposition-valued function ι with
domain I, all of whose values commute with one another, is extendible to a
propositional interpretation of all I-ary BEs; it is not necessary to specify the
algebra A, which may be taken to be any PA that includes the image of ι and
is sufficiently complete that the meets and joins occurring in the BEs under
consideration may be formed within it.
In addition to the propositional interpretations, several algebras A are of par-
ticular interest. If A = 2, the 2-element algebra, then we may identify 1 with
true and 0 with false. A 2-interpretation is an interpretation in the usual
sense of assigning a truth value to expressions, where ∼,
∨
, and
∧
are logical
negation, disjunction, and conjunction, respectively. These expressions may
be considered to belong to a language that permits infinite disjunction and
conjunction. Of course, letting 0 and 1 be respectively the zero and unit propo-
sitions, 2-interpretations may be viewed as propositional interpretations.
We may also take A to be a boolean set-algebra, for which ∼,
∨
, and
∧
cor-
respond to set-theoretic complementation (relative to some fixed set), union,
and intersection. One important such case is that of the algebra of all sets of
subsets of the index set I, with the interpretation [[ǫi]] = {X ⊆ I | i ∈ X}.
10
Equivalently via the correspondence of a subset X of I with its characteristic
function χX ∈ I2 (the set of functions from I to the set 2 = {0, 1}), given by
χX(i) =


1 if i ∈ X
0 if i /∈ X,
we take A to be the algebra of all subsets of I2, with the interpretation ǫι =
{f ∈ I2 | f(i) = 1}.
Several variations may be played on this theme by forming subalgebras and
quotient algebras. One such is defined in terms of a partial order P. Let DP
be the set of prefilters on P. For X ⊆ |P|, DX
def
= {D ∈ DP | X ⊆ D};
and for p ∈ |P|, Dp
def
= D{p}. If we let A = S(D
P), the set-algebra consisting
of all subsets of DP, we may interpret |P|-ary expressions according to the
prescription [[ǫp]] = Dp.
If I is countable and n is a countably complete ideal in the Borel set-algebra
B for I2, the quotient algebra B/n, obtained by identifying elements P and
Q of B whose difference P − Q is in n, is a complete BA, which is a natural
valuation algebra for I-ary BEs. Of particular interest for the present work is
the case that n = {X ∈ B | µ(X) = 0} for a Borel measure µ.
The property of genericity may be used to relate A-interpretations andS(DA)-
interpretations. We defer a general discussion of this connection for the mo-
ment, and focus on the case of propositions.
Definition 8 Recall that we have defined a directed set, or prefilter, in a
partial order to be a set D such that any two elements of D have a common
extension in D. We say that a set D of propositions is directed iff all members
of D commute with one another and D is directed in the usual partial ordering
of propositions (i.e., with ≤=⊆). A propositional prefilter is a directed set of
propositions. Let D be the set of all propositional prefilters, and let D be the
boolean set-algebra of subsets of D.
Suppose P is a set of commuting projections. We define two interpretations
for P-expressions, a proposition-valued interpretation [[·]]pi and a D-valued
interpretation [[·]]δ, which are uniquely determined by the conditions
[[ǫP ]]
pi =P
[[ǫP ]]
δ = {D ∈ D | P ∈ D}
for all P ∈ P.
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Suppose E is a P-ary BE. Let S consists of the sets
(1) {[[E ′]]pi}, for all E ′ ∈ Eˆ;
(2) {[[E ′]]pi | E ′ ∈ E}, for all E such that
∨
E ∈ Eˆ; and
(3) {∼[[E ′]]pi | E ′ ∈ E}, for all E such that
∧
E ∈ Eˆ.
The following theorem is converse to Inference 4 and is the key to implementing
the hidden-variables program.
Theorem 2 Suppose P, E, and S are as above, and suppose D is an S-
generic propositional prefilter all of whose members commute with all the mem-
bers of P. Then
D ∈ [[E]]δ ⇐⇒ [[E]]pi ∈ D. (9)
PROOF. By induction on the complexity (i.e., rank) of E. (9) is trivially
true if E = ǫP for some P ∈ P.
Suppose E = ∼E ′ and E ′ satisfies (9). Let P = [[E ′]]pi; then [[E]]pi = ∼P . Since
by definition E and E ′ are in Eˆ, {∼P} and {P} are in S. As D is S-generic,
D contains ∼P or an element Q such that Q|∼P , and D contains P or an
element Q such that Q|P . It is not possible that D contain elements Q and
Q′ such that Q|∼P and Q′|P , for in that case Q|Q′; hence, either ∼P or P is
in D, and
D ∈ [[E]]δ ⇐⇒ D /∈ [[E ′]]
δ
⇐⇒ P /∈ D ⇐⇒ ∼P ∈ D,
so E satisfies (9).
Now suppose E =
∨
E and each E ′ ∈ E satisfies (9). By hypothesis, either D
contains [[E ′]]pi for some E ′ ∈ E or for some Q ∈ D, Q is incompatible with
[[E ′]]pi for all E ′ ∈ E , in which case Q is incompatible with
∨
E′∈E [[E
′]]pi = [[E]]pi,
so D cannot contain [[E]]pi; in other words,
[[E]]pi ∈ D =⇒ (∃E ′ ∈ E) [[E ′]]
pi
∈ D.
Inversely, as we have just seen, if [[E]]pi is not in D then ∼[[E]]pi ∈ D, i.e.,∧
E′∈E ∼[[E
′]]pi ∈ D, whence it follows that [[E ′]]pi /∈ D for all E ′ ∈ E . Thus,
D ∈ [[E]]δ ⇐⇒ (∃E ′ ∈ E)D ∈ [[E ′]]
δ
⇐⇒ (∃E ′ ∈ E) [[E ′]]
pi
∈ D
⇐⇒ [[E]]pi ∈ D,
so E satisfies (9).
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If E =
∧
E the desired identity follows from the identity
∧
E = ∼
∨
E′∈E ∼E
′. ✷
Definition 9 A boolean expression E is Borel iff for every subexpression of
E of the form
∨
E or
∧
E , E is countable.
Proposition 3 An expression E is Borel iff Eˆ is countable.
PROOF. The if-direction is immediate. We prove the only if-direction by in-
duction on the rank of E. Let I be the index set (which need not be countable).
For each i ∈ I, ǫ̂i = {ǫi} has cardinality 1, so it is countable.
Suppose E = ∼E ′ and Eˆ ′ is countable. Then Eˆ = {E} ∪ Eˆ ′ is countable.
Suppose E is of the form
∨
E or
∧
E , where for each E ′ ∈ E , Eˆ ′ is countable.
Then Eˆ = {E} ∪
⋃
E′∈E Eˆ
′ is countable. ✷
3.2.3 Statistics of generic states
As an application of Thm. 2 and Prop. 3 suppose P is an algebra of proposi-
tions that correspond to physical observables for a system S. (Note that this
cannot consist of all binary observables, since the propositions in P commute
by definition.) If we suppose that by ‘physical observable’ we mean a prop-
erty of S for which there is a describable measurement, then P is countable,
because there are only countably many descriptions in any effective system of
descriptions. Let E be the set of Borel P-ary expressions that are definable
in the same sense. Then E is likewise countable. Since any definable boolean
expression applied to a describable measurement yields a description of a mea-
surement, we may suppose that P is closed under the action of the expressions
in E—i.e., letting [[ǫP ]]
pi = P for all P ∈ P as in (9), [[E]]pi ∈ P for all E ∈ E .
Let S be the union of the sets S defined for Theorem 2 for each E ∈ E . The
members of S are subsets of P.
Let H0 be the set of S-generic ultrafilters on P. Letting [[ǫP ]]
δ = {F ∈ UP |
P ∈ F} as in (9) (with the technical modification that we deal exclusively
with ultrafilters), the set C of posable questions is the set of sets of the form
[[E]]δ, for E ∈ E . Premises 1–3 are easily shown to be satisfied. Premise 4
follows from Prop. 1, so H0 qualifies as H
P. By Inference 4, H0 is the largest
set that does.
We now examine the statistics of models H ⊆ H0 with H satisfying Prem-
ises 1–4. As in [13] suppose ψ is q-homogeneous for a sequence 〈Pn | n ∈ ω〉 of
commuting propositions inP. LetP be the PA generated by {Pn | n ∈ ω}, and
let Pˆ be the PA generated by E acting on {Pn | n ∈ ω}. Note that P ⊆ Pˆ, and
these algebras have the same completion as PAs. Let V˜ = [ψ]P, the smallest
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closed subspace of V that contains ψ and is closed under all projections in P.
Note that V˜ = [ψ]P = [ψ]Pˆ. We may regard Pˆ as a PA in V˜.
Let µq be the q-homogeneous measure on the algebra B of Borel subsets of
ω2, and let P (·) be the canonical homomorphism of B to P as in [13]. Then
µq(X) = 1 ⇐⇒ P (X) = 1. Let Bˆ be the subalgebra B generated from
the basic open sets by the BEs in E . Then P (·) maps Bˆ into Pˆ. Given an
ultrafilter F on P, define fF ∈ ω2 by: fF (n) = 1 ⇐⇒ Pn ∈ F . Let Cq be
as in (7) and let Lq ⊆
ω2 be the corresponding Borel set as in [13]. 4 Let Eq
be the corresponding boolean expression. In the terminology of Theorem 2,
Cq = [[Eq]]
δ ∩UP and P (Lq) = [[Eq]]
pi. Lq itself is the value of Eq in the natural
interpretation of Eq in the set-algebra S(
ω2). We suppose Eq ∈ E , i.e., we
suppose that Eq represents a posable question; it is, after all, the principal
question we propose to pose. By virtue of Theorem 2, since H ⊆ H0 by
necessity, the boolean value [[Cq]] (in the terminology of Section 3) is [[Eq]]
pi,
i.e., P (Lq). As before, by the law of large numbers, µq(Lq) = 1, so [[Cq]] =
[[Eq]]
pi = P (Lq) = 1. Thus every pseudoclassical filter is in Cq, i.e., every
pseudoclassical state exhibits the correct limiting behavior of the frequency
statistic.
Theorem 4 The same argument applies to all definable tests of randomness
as discussed in [13], so observations performed on a pseudoclassical state will
give every appearance of a stochastic process with the usual interpretation of
the squared norm as probability even though their outcomes are predetermined.
4 The general method of forcing
4.1 The regular algebra
The power of the genericity property—as expressed for propositional algebras
in Theorem 2—lies in the fact that it renders a great variety of assertions
regarding a prefilter D, as represented by the left side of (9), equivalent to
assertions of the very limited type represented by the right side of (9). If we
let ǫP be the sentence ‘P ∈ D’ for each proposition P , and we interpret ∼,∨
, and
∧
as logical negation, disjunction, and conjunction, as discussed pre-
viously, we obtain a linguistic expression for the left side of (9). In general,
of course this expression involves infinite boolean operations and is therefore
somewhat nonstandard, and we will eventually drop these in favor of conven-
tional linguistic constructs. For the moment, however, let us view a BE E as
4 Note that M , N , and n in (7) take on integer values, so the unions and intersec-
tions are countable.
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a predicate with one free variable, which a prefilter will make true or false
according to the left side–equivalently the right side–of (9). As is customary
in discussions of this topic, without any significant loss of generality and with
some gain in convenience, we restrict our attention to generic ultrafilters, for
which we use the variable ‘G’.
The notion of genericity as we have developed it for propositional algebras
applies essentially verbatim to an arbitrary complete BA, but to explore this
concept fully we must broaden our outlook to include not just boolean alge-
bras, but partial orders (POs) in general. We must do this also as a practical
matter, so that we may extend our results about algebras of commuting propo-
sitions to certain systems of propositions that do not necessarily commute, and
achieve a more comprehensive realization of the hidden-variables program.
As the following series of definitions and the subsequent discussion make clear,
boolean algebras arise naturally in the theory of generic filters on POs.
Definition 10 Suppose P is a PO and X ⊆ |P|. Let X⊥ def= {p ∈ |P| | (∀q ∈
X)p|q}, and X
def
= X⊥⊥. Note that X ⊆ X. X is regular iff X = X.
Definition 11 Suppose P is a PO and p ∈ |P|. Then
⌈p⌉
def
= {q ∈ |P| | q ≤ p}
⌊p⌋
def
= {q ∈ |P| | q ≥ p}.
P is separative iff for all p ∈ |P|, ⌈p⌉ is regular.
The separativity property gets its name from the equivalent formulation: p 6≤
q =⇒ (∃r ≤ p) r|q, i.e., r “separates” p from q.
Let Reg P be the set of regular subsets of |P|. Reg P has a natural structure
as a BA for which ≤=⊆. In this algebra
∼X =X⊥∧
X =
⋂
X∨
X =∼ (
∧
X∈X ∼X)
=
(⋂
X∈X X
⊥
)⊥
= (
⋃
X )⊥⊥
=
⋃
X .
Note that meets and joins are defined for all subsets X of RegP, so
Proposition 5 RegP is a complete boolean algebra.
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The map p 7→ ⌈p⌉ is a homomorphism of P onto a dense subset of Reg P−. If P
is separative this is the map p 7→ ⌈p⌉ and it is an isomorphism. Reg P is—up
to isomorphism—the unique extension of P to a complete BA in which |P| is
dense. That is, if ι : P→ A is an isomorphism of P with a dense subset of A−
(treated as a partial order), then ι may be extended (uniquely, in fact) to an
isomorphism ι′ : Reg P→ A. We call Reg P the regular algebra for P.
For any BA A we define RegA to be Reg (A−), and—identifying P ∈ A with
⌈P ⌉ ∈ RegA—we call this the regular completion of A. Note that A− is a
separative PO for any BA A, so A− is dense in RegA. 5
4.2 The forcing language
Suppose P is a partial order. By definition, P is of the form (|P|,≤), where
|P| is a class and ≤ is a binary relation on |P| that satisfies Def. 33. A lan-
guage appropriate to this structure would have a predicate symbol for ≤ along
with all the other paraphernalia of a formal language: variables; symbols for
negation, conjunction, and other logical connectives; quantifier symbols ‘∀’
and ‘∃’; a symbol ‘=’ for identity; and grouping symbols, say ‘(’ and ‘)’. We
define LP to be such a language with the following modifications. First, we
add a unary predicate symbol G. By this we mean that an interpretation of
5 We note in that if A is a propositional algebra then there is a natural map
ι : RegA → A, where A is the completion of A as a PA, viz., ι(X) =
∨
X for all
regular X ⊆ A−.
im ι need not be dense in A. For example, suppose A is the PA generated by
propositions 〈Pn | n ∈ ω〉 for which there exists a q-homogeneous vector with 0 <
q < 1. (This is just a convenient choice—many other PAs would serve.) Following
the conventions of [13], we let Iσ = {f ∈
ω2 | σ ⊆ f}, which we call a basic interval,
and we let P (·) be the standard map of Borel sets to propositions defined from
〈Pn | n ∈ ω〉. The propositions P (Iσ) form a dense subset of A. Let 〈Kn | n ∈ ω〉 be
an enumeration of the basic intervals, and for each n ∈ ω, let K ′n ⊆ Kn be a basic
interval such that µq(K
′
n) < 2
−n. Let X = {P (K ′n) | n ∈ ω}. By construction, X
is dense in A, so X⊥ = 0, i.e., ∅, and X = X⊥⊥ = 1, i.e., |A|−. X is the smallest
element of RegA that includes X.
By construction, however, µq
(∨P
n∈ωK
′
n
)
< 1, so
∨
X < 1. Let Q = 1 −
∨
X.
We claim that there is no nonzero element of ι→ RegA below Q. Suppose to the
contrary that X ′ is a nonempty regular subset of A− such that
∨
X ′ = ι(X ′) ≤ Q.
Then for all P ∈ X and all P ′ ∈ X ′, P ⊥ P ′, which is not possible, as X is dense
in A.
This corresponds to the fact that the open sets in ω2 are not dense in the measure
algebra for µq, which may be defined as the algebra of Borel subsets of
ω2 divided
by the ideal of sets of measure 0. The closed sets, it may be noted, do form a dense
set in this algebra.
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LP assigns to G a subclass of |P|. Second, for each p ∈ |P| we add a constant
symbol pˇ. We will restrict the interpretation of LP so that pˇ always denotes p.
Finally, we allow arbitrary disjunction and conjunction, i.e., for any set E of
LP-expressions we have expressions
∨
E and
∧
E , which have the usual inter-
pretation vis-a`-vis the interpretations of the expressions in E . 6 As long as we
restrict interpretations of L to structures (|P|,≤,G, . . . , pˇ, . . .) with pˇ denoting
p for all p ∈ |P|, we may replace any existential quantifier construction ∃p φ(p)
by the disjunction
∨
p∈|P|φ(pˇ) and any universal quantifier construction ∀p φ(p)
by the conjunction
∧
p∈|P|φ(pˇ). In this way we may replace any expression of
L by a quantifier-free expression, i.e., a boolean combination of expressions
of the form pˇ ≤ qˇ and G(pˇ). We may eliminate any expression of the former
type in favor of its truth value because we know that pˇ≤qˇ is true or false
according as p ≤ q or p 6≤ q. This leaves a boolean combination of expressions
G(pˇ). Letting ǫp be the sentence G(pˇ) for each p ∈ |P|, every sentence of L is
equivalent to a |P|-ary boolean expression.
We are interested in the structure of boolean interpretations of LP. One inter-
pretation suggests itself immediately.
Definition 12 The canonical interpretation ιP of LP is the Reg P-interpretation
defined by [[G(pˇ)]]ι
P
= [[ǫp]]
ιP = ⌈p⌉, where Reg P is the complete BA of regular
subsets of |P| and ⌈p⌉ = {q ∈ |P| | q ≤ p}.
Definition 13 In general, if ι is an interpretation of LP, an ι-validity is a
sentence σ of LP such that [[σ]]ι = 1. Validity unqualified means ιP-validity.
Note that we have used the same symbols for the respective logical operations
of disjunction and conjunction in LP as for the corresponding algebraic opera-
tions of join and meet. We extend this convention to negation/complementation,
denoted by ‘∼’, implication, denoted by ‘→’, and logical equivalence or bi-
implication, denoted by ‘↔’. That is, we let
P→Q
def
= (∼P ) ∨Q (10)
P↔Q
def
= (P→Q) ∧ (Q→P ) = (P ∧Q) ∨ (∼P ∧∼Q), (11)
6 Note that we have used the same symbols for the disjunction- and conjunction-
forming operations of L as we have been using for the corresponding abstract BE-
forming operations, which are the boldface form of the corresponding symbols for
disjunction and conjunction in the metalanguage, which is the language in which
this paper is written. In this way we maintain in our typography the distinction
between use (lightface) and mention (boldface) of linguistic entities. We will do this
for several other expression-building operations but will otherwise tolerate some
ambiguity on this score. We will also use quotation marks, as in the paragraph
containing this footnote, to effect this distinction.
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for elements P,Q of any BA.We indicate the corresponding expression-building
operations in L by the boldface versions of these.
We leave it as an instructive exercise for the reader to show that each of the
following sentences is an ιP-validity:
∧
p
∧
q≥p(G(pˇ)→G(qˇ)), (12)∧
p,q
(
(G(pˇ)∧G(qˇ))→
∨
r≤p,qG(rˇ)
)
, (13)∧
X⊆|P|
∨
q∈X∪X⊥G(qˇ), (14)
where p, q, and r range over |P|. Together these sentences say that G is a
generic filter, 7 so
[[G is a generic filter]]ι
P
= 1, (15)
where by ‘generic’ we mean generic with respect to all subsets of |P|. It must
be emphasized that the fact that in general a filter on P cannot be generic
with respect to all subsets of |P| (specifically, in an atomless algebra no filter is
generic with respect to its complement) is not at odds with (15), which makes
no claim as to the existence of generic filters. The logical position of this sort
of statement will become clear in Section 6.
Theorem 6 ιP is universal among boolean interpretations of B|P| for which
(12–14) are validities, i.e., for any BA A and any ι : |P| → |A|, if
[[G is a generic filter]]ι = 1
then there exists a complete homomorphism h : Reg P→ A such that for any
sentence σ of LP, [[σ]]ι = h
(
[[σ]]ι
P)
.
PROOF. Suppose X ⊆ |P|. Then
( ∨
p∈X
[[G(pˇ)]]ι
)
∧
( ∨
p∈X⊥
[[G(pˇ)]]ι
)
=
∨
p∈X
q∈X⊥
([[G(pˇ)]]ι ∧ [[G(qˇ)]]ι) = 0,
7 We are treating ‘G’ as a unary predicate symbol, but a unary predicate is identifi-
able with the class of elements that satisfy it, so we may also regard ‘G’ as denoting
a class, in this case a subclass of |P|. In other words, ‘G(x)’ corresponds to ‘x ∈ G’.
It is in the latter sense that we say ‘G is a generic filter’.
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as follows from the ι-validity of (13). (If p ∈ X and q ∈ X⊥ then there is no
r ≤ p, q, and the join of the empty set is 0.) Moreover,
( ∨
p∈X
[[G(pˇ)]]ι
)
∨
( ∨
p∈X⊥
[[G(pˇ)]]ι
)
= 1,
as follows from the ι-validity of (14). Hence,
(∨
p∈X [[G(pˇ)]]
ι
)
= ∼
(∨
p∈X⊥ [[G(pˇ)]]
ι
)
. (16)
Let h be defined by
h(X) =
∨
p∈X ι(p)
for every X ∈ Reg P, i.e., for every regular X ⊆ |P|. Since by definition
∼X = X⊥, (16) implies that h(∼X) = ∼h(X).
We now show that h (
∨
X ) =
∨
X∈X h(X), i.e.,∨
p∈
∨
X
[[G(pˇ)]]ι =
∨
X∈X
∨
p∈X
[[G(pˇ)]]ι,
for all sets X of regular subsets of |P|. By the definition of join in Reg P, this
is equivalent to
∨
p∈
⋃
X
[[G(pˇ)]]ι =
∨
p∈
⋃
X [[G(pˇ)]]
ι,
which follows from (16) applied first with
⋃
X for X and then with (
⋃
X )⊥
for X , keeping in mind that Y is by definition Y ⊥⊥.
Since [[σ]]ι = h([[σ]]ι
P
) for σ = G(pˇ) for all p ∈ |P|, it follows by induction on
the rank of σ that [[σ]]ι = h([[σ]]ι
P
) for σ ∈ LP. ✷
Note that (13) and (14) together imply (12), which explains why we did not
have to use (12) explicitly in the proof of Theorem 6.
Definition 14 Suppose P is a partial order and σ is a sentence of LP. We
say that an element p ∈ |P| forces σ, p  σ, iff p ∈ [[σ]]ι
P
.
Recall that the starting point for our realization of the hidden-variables pro-
gram for a propositional algebra P was the premise that any question that
can be formulated from the propositions of P is equivalent for pseudoclassical
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states to a single proposition, which is in the completion P of P as a PA. We
were careful to keep track of the size of the algebras involved and the number
of conditions in the set S with respect to which genericity was defined, so that
we could make use of the fact that S-generic filters exist if S is countable.
We may streamline the argument by supposing at the outset that P is com-
plete and dealing with P-valued interpretations of LP, in effect using P-valued
logic to manipulate LP-expressions. It must be emphasized that this character-
ization of the algebra of P-valued expressions should not be taken to suggest
that truth is “really” P-valued.
At any time we may restate our results in terms of S-generic filters for suitable
S. Of course, the existence of such filters then becomes an issue, and we will
gain more insight into this in Section 6.
Let us formulate the discussion in Section 3.2 leading up to Theorem 4 in
these terms. Let φq be the sentence
∧
M<0
∨
N∈ω
∧
n>N
∨
σ∈n2∣∣∣q− 1
n
n−1∑
m=0
σ(m)
∣∣∣< 1
M
∧
m<n
G
(
(∼)1−σ(m)Pˇm
)
.
Then by the same reasoning as before [[φq]] = 1. Hence, if F is a sufficiently
generic filter on P, φ holds with F for G.
The set TP of validities of LP is easily shown to be closed under logical infer-
ence. 8 In the special case that P is P− for an algebra P of propositions for
a quantum system S, TP may be regarded as the pseudoclassical theory of S
(as regards P): it consists of all those and only those sentences that are true
of all pseudoclassical states. In this terminology Theorem 4 becomes
[[it looks like the Copenhagen interpretation is right]] = 1.
4.3 Contextual hidden-variables models
Recall that FΨ,P is the set of propositions P ∈ P true of a pseudoclassical
state Ψ, where P is a PA. Up to now the discussion has taken place in the
context of a single PA, but we can easily carry out the key forcing construction
8 In logic one may define a theory in a language L to be any set of formulas of L and
define T, the deductive closure of T, to be the closure of T under logical inference,
or deduction. For most purposes, T is equivalent to T, and when we speak of the
theory of something, we refer to a deductively closed theory.
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for any number of PAs simultaneously if we allow for full contextuality, i.e.,
independence of FΨ,P from FΨ,P
′
for P 6= P′, so that a given proposition P
might be in FΨ,P but not in FΨ,P
′
for some P and P′ that both contain P
and therefore serve as different contexts for the measurement of P . We do this
as follows.
Suppose P is a set of PAs, which could be the set of all PAs for a Hilbert space
V. Let P = (|P|,≤), where |P| is the set of functions p with domain P such
that for all P ∈ P, p(P) ∈ P−, and p ≤ q iff for all P ∈ P, p(P) ≤ q(P). For
any P ∈ P, and any dense D ⊆ P, the set
{p ∈ |P| | p(P) ∈ D}
is dense in P. Thus, if G is a generic filter on P then {p(P) | p ∈ G} is a
generic filter on P for each P ∈ P.
Note that no condition is imposed relating p(P) and p(P′) for distinct PAs
P and P′. If we identify pseudoclassical states with generic filters on P we
obtain therefore a hidden-variables model that is maximally contextual.
Certain other partial orders P′ ⊆ P may be used in place of P. It is sufficient
that {p ∈ |P′| | p(P) ∈ D} be dense in P′ for any P ∈ P and any dense
D ⊆ P. For example, we may let |P′| be the set of p ∈ P such that p(P) = 1
for all but finitely many P ∈ P.
In the next section we will see how a degree of noncontextuality may be
incorporated into hidden-variables models.
5 Propositional systems
5.1 Pseudoclassical states and generic filters for propositional systems
The creation of hidden-variables models by the method generic filters can be
generalized to certain propositional systems (PSs) that are not boolean.
Definition 15 Given a PS R, let R− = R \ {0}. A semifilter on R is a
nonempty subset F of R− such that
(1) (∀P ∈ F )(∀Q ∈ R)(P ≤ Q =⇒ Q ∈ F ),
(2) (∀P,Q ∈ F )(PQ =⇒ P ∧Q ∈ F ).
Recall that ‘PQ’ means P and Q commute. A complete semifilter on R is a
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semifilter on R that is closed under general meet. Given any S ⊆ R there is a
smallest semifilter Ssf and a smallest complete semifilter Scsf that include S.
F is full iff for all P ∈ R, either P or ∼P is in F . We also call a full semifilter
an ultrasemifilter.
If Ψ is a pseudoclassical state for R then the set FΨ,R of propositions in R
true of Ψ is an ultrasemifilter. As in the special case of PAs, FΨ,R contains
all relevant information about Ψ, and any question that we may pose of pseu-
doclassical states may be interpreted as a question about semifilters. We may
identify such a question with the set of semifilters it defines, as we did in
Section 3 for the case of filters on a PA. This may be characterized as the
extensional point of view. As we saw there, this approach necessitates con-
sideration of the issue of existence of generic filters, which we prefer to defer;
so for the present discussion we will take the intensional approach developed
in Section 3.2.2, i.e., we will deal directly with boolean values of expressions
built from primitive expressions of the form G(Pˇ ), i.e., Pˇ ∈ G.
As in Section 3.2.2 these expressions have a natural interpretation as state-
ments in a language L = LR appropriate to structures
S = (R,≤,,G, . . . , Pˇ , . . .), (17)
where R is the propositional system of interest, ≤ has the usual meaning,  is
a binary relation symbol denoting commutativity of propositions, G is a unary
predicate symbol, and for each P ∈ R, Pˇ is a constant that denotes P . As
before, L is an ordinary language except that we allow infinitary disjunction
and conjunction, and we may replace any existential or universal quantifier
construction by the corresponding disjunction or conjunction over P ∈ R, so
every expression of L is equivalent to a boolean combination of expressions
of the form Pˇ ≤ Qˇ, PˇQˇ, and G(Pˇ ). Expressions of the first two types may
be eliminated in favor of their truth values, which are constant, leaving a
boolean combination of expressions G(Pˇ ). Letting ǫP be the sentence G(Pˇ ) for
each P ∈ R, every sentence of L is given canonically by an R-ary boolean
expression. We will represent the expression-building operations of L, other
than quantification, by the same symbols as we use for the abstract BE-forming
operations, which are the boldface forms of the corresponding symbols of the
metalanguage, which is the language in which this paper is written. In this way
we can maintain the distinction between making an assertion and mentioning
it.
We wish to define an L-theory TR that expresses ‘G is a pseudoclassical semi-
filter’, and an interpretation ιˆ of L in a BA AR such that [[TR]]
ιˆ
= 1 and ιˆ is
universal in the sense that for any interpretation ι of the class BR of R-ary
boolean expressions in a BA A, if [[TR]]
ι
= 1 then there exists a complete ho-
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momorphism h : AR → A such that for any sentence σ of LR, [[σ]]ι = h
(
[[σ]]ιˆ
)
.
Definition 16 Let TR consist of the sentences
∧
P
∧
Q≥P
(G(Pˇ )→G(Qˇ)), (18)
∧
S∈ComR
((∧
P∈S
G(Pˇ )
)
→G
(∧ˇ
S
))
, (19)∧
P
(G(Pˇ )∨G(∼ˇP )), (20)
where P and Q range over R and ComR is the set of all subsets of R all
of whose members commute with one another.
∧ˇ
S and ∼ˇP are the constant
symbols of L that denote the elements
∧
S and ∼P of R.
Definition 17 If p is a subset of R we let Ep
def
=
∧
P∈pǫP =
∧
P∈pG(Pˇ ).
Suppose ι is an interpretation of BR in a BA A such that [[(18) ∨(19)]]ι = 1.
Then for any p ⊆ R, [[Ep]]
ι = [[Epcsf ]]
ι, where pcsf is the completion of p to
complete semifilter. That is, the sentence
∧
P∈p
G(Pˇ )↔
∧
P∈pcsf
G(Pˇ )
is an ι-validity. To prove this one represents the process of completing p to pcsf
as a well-ordered sequence p = p0 ⊆ p1 ⊆ · · · pα ⊆ · · · pη = p
csf . This process
consists of steps of two sorts: in one sort we close pα upward, while in the other
sort we add all meets of commuting subsets of pα. To accommodate both sorts
of step we extend the usual partition of natural numbers into even and odd
to all ordinals by declaring that for any limit ordinal η and any n ∈ ω, η + n
is even or odd according as n is even or odd. We define pα recursively by
pα =


⋃
{pβ | β < α} if α is a limit ordinal
{Q ∈ R | (∃P ∈ pα−1)P ≤ Q} if α is an odd ordinal
{
∧
S | S ∈ Compα} if α is an even successor ordinal,
where Compα is the set of all commuting subsets of pα. We show by induction
on α that
∧
P∈pα [[G(Pˇ )]]
ι
=
∧
P∈p [[G(Pˇ )]]
ι
, using (18) and (19) in alternation
to handle the successor steps. The limit case of the induction is immediate.
Thus, as far as meets of primitive expressions are concerned we may restrict
our attention to the expressions of the form Ep for p a complete semifilter.
Definition 18 Let PR be the set of complete semifilters on R, which we make
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a partial order by reverse inclusion, i.e., p ≤ q ⇐⇒ p ⊇ q.
In terms of the forcing relation (Def. 14), Premise 1 states that anything that
is true of a pseudoclassical state is forced to be true by some proposition that
it satisfies. In the general case of a propositional system R we cannot expect
that single propositions will suffice to force everything about a pseudoclassical
state. For example, if P and Q are propositions that are not orthogonal, but
P∩Q = {0}, then P∧Q (using ‘∧’ to indicate the formation of the conjunction
of P and Q as predicates applicable to Ψ) may be true of a pseudoclassical
state Ψ, but neither P nor Q nor any other proposition forces both P and
Q. (Note that P and Q cannot commute in this circumstance. If P and Q
do commute then P∧Q is equivalent to the proposition P ∧Q since FΨ is an
ultrafilter.) The premise that follows is the natural generalization of Premise 1
to propositional systems.
Premise 1′ Suppose Ψ is a pseudoclassical state for a complete propositional
system R. Then for any σ ∈ LR, σ is true of Ψ, i.e, σ is true with G interpreted
as FΨ,R, iff for some p ∈ PR, p ⊆ FΨ,R and σ is true of all pseudoclassical Ψ′
such that p ⊆ FΨ
′,R.
Recall that the language LR includes the class BR of boolean expressions built
up from the primitive expressions ǫP , i.e., G(Pˇ ). As discussed above, in the
interest of efficiency we consider all of these to be questions “posable” of a
pseudoclassical state in its incarnation as a semifilter G. Thus Premises 2 and 3
are inherent in this formulation. Premise 4, which in our original formulation
is the fundamental existence premise, corresponds to (20), the only purely
positive statement of membership in G among the sentences of TR.
The reasoning of Section 3.1 applies to show that pseudoclassical semifilters
FΨ,R on R correspond to generic filters FΨ,P
R
on PR via the relations
FΨ,R=
⋃
FΨ,P
R
(21)
FΨ,P
R
=PFΨ,R
def
= {p ∈ PR | p ⊆ FΨ,R}. (22)
As is customary in the context of forcing, we will refer to the members of
P = PR as conditions.
5.2 The sufficiency of genericity for (some) propositional systems
Let us now examine under what circumstances generic PR-filters fulfill the
requirements of the hidden-variables program.
Given the importance of filters on PR, it is convenient to expand our language
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LR to allow explicit reference to elements of PR. Thus we consider structures
of the form S = (R,PR,∈,≤,,G, . . . , Pˇ , . . . , . . . , pˇ, . . .), where G is a unary
predicate on R, and the language LP
R
appropriate to them. LP
R
contains a
name pˇ for each p ∈ PR, as well as a name Pˇ for each P ∈ R, so we may
eliminate quantifiers in favor of boolean operations, as we could for LR. We
may also replace primitive expressions of the form Pˇ ∈ pˇ, Pˇ ≤ Qˇ, and PˇQˇ
by their truth values, since—as in the case of LR—the interpretation of these
formulas is invariable. It follows that every expression of LP
R
is equivalent to
a boolean combination of the primitive expressions ǫP
def
= G(Pˇ ), just as for LR.
We note that for any P ∈ R, the smallest p ∈ PR containing P (smallest as a
set, therefore largest as an element of PR), i.e., the completion {P}csf of {P}
to a complete semifilter, is
{Q ∈ R | Q ≥ P},
and the smallest element of RegPR containing {P}csf , i.e., the smallest regular
subset of PR containing {P}csf , is
⌈{P}csf⌉= {p ∈ PR | (∀Q ≥ P )Q ∈ p}
= {p ∈ PR | (∀q ⊇ p)(∃r ⊇ q)P ∈ r},
where q and r range over PR and we have used ‘⊇’ in place of ‘≤’ to denote the
order relation on PR to avoid confusion with the order relation on propositions.
Definition 19 For P ∈ R, let [P ]
def
= ⌈{P}csf⌉. The canonical interpretation
ιP
R
of LP
R
is the Reg PR-interpretation defined by [[G(Pˇ )]]
ιP
R
= [P ].
It is straightforward to show that
[[(18)]]ι
PR
= 1. (23)
The viability of the hidden-variables program depends on (19) and (20) being
ιP
R
-validities as well, but this is not true for all PSs R. For example, suppose
R is finite. Then every R-semifilter is complete, and (20) implies that for every
R-semifilter p, for every P ∈ R, either p∪ {P} or p∪ {∼P} may be extended
to a R-semifilter. It follows that any R-semifilter may be extended to an R-
ultrasemifilter. A number of no-hidden-variables theorems provide examples
of finite PSs for which ultrasemifilters do not exist. In particular, R may be
chosen to correspond to a system of physically meaningful operators, e.g., in
Sec. IV of [10], operators relating to measurements of the angular momentum
of a spin-1 particle.
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A sufficient condition on R to ensure the validity of TR may be formulated in
terms of the following notion of entailment
Definition 20 A set S ⊆ R entails a proposition P , SRP , iff P ∈ Scsf . S
is consistent iff S 6R0.
Note that if every P ∈ S holds for a pseudoclassical Ψ and SRP then P
holds for Ψ, whence the name.
This notion of entailment differs from ordinary logical entailment in that it
does not in general incorporate the inference principle of reductio ad absurdum,
which states that if S is a set of propositions and P is a proposition then 9
(S ∪ {P}0) =⇒ (S∼P ). (24)
It is interesting that this classical logical principle, interpreted as a condition
on a quantum propositional system, should be just what’s needed to create
the pseudoclassical states called for in the hidden-variables program.
Definition 21 Suppose R is a propositional system. We say that R is reduc-
tive iff for any S ⊆ R and P ∈ R, S ∪ {∼P}R0 =⇒ SRP .
Theorem 7 Suppose R is a reductive PS. Then PR is separative,
[[G(Pˇ )]]
ιP
R
= {p ∈ PR | P ∈ p}, (25)
and
[[∼G(Pˇ )]]
ιP
R
= [[G(∼ˇP )]]. (26)
PROOF. We first show that P = PR is separative. Suppose therefore that
p, q ∈ P and p 6≤ q, i.e., p + q. We must show that for some r ⊇ p, r|q, i.e.,
r ∪ q is inconsistent. To this end let P be a proposition in q \ p. Since P is
9 The principle of reductio ad absurdum is related to the law of the excluded middle,
which asserts φ∨∼φ for all formulas φ, and which is often advanced as a salient
difference between “quantum” logic and ordinary or “classical” logic, inasmuch as
a quantum state may not satisfy either P or ∼P with certainty, for P a quantum
proposition. We prefer not to put it this way because we are ultimately interested
in pseudoclassical states, for which either φ or ∼φ does hold with certainty for any
formula φ—a fortiori for φ = P , where P is a quantum proposition; because P ∨∼P
actually is 1; and because we quite specifically wish to avoid any suggestion that
there is any necessary special quantum logic—the usefulness of boolean-valued logic
in the context of hidden-variables models notwithstanding.
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reductive, p∪{∼P} is consistent. Let r = (p ∪ {∼P})csf . Then r ⊇ p and r∪q
contains P and ∼P , so it is inconsistent as desired.
(25) now follows immediately from the definitions of ιP
R
and [ · ].
To prove (26) we observe that by definition
[[∼G(Pˇ )]] = [[G(Pˇ )]]
⊥
= {p ∈ P | (∀q ∈ [[G(Pˇ ]]) p|q},
i.e., the conditions in [[∼G(Pˇ )]] are just those that are inconsistent with every
condition that contains P . Since R is reductive, these are just the conditions
that contain ∼P . ✷
Theorem 8 Suppose R is a reductive PS. Then [[TR]]
ιP
R
= 1.
PROOF. We have already noted that (18) is valid for any PS R. The validity
of (19) follows quite directly from (25), and that of (20) from (26). ✷
We should like to know that the hidden-variables theory just presented for
reductive PSs extends the theory we have developed for PAs; in other words, if
R is a reductive PS then for any boolean A ⊆ R, pseudoclassical R-semifilters
correspond to pseudoclassical A-filters under the map F 7→ F ∩ A. Clearly,
for any R-semifilter, F ∩ A is an A-filter, so we only have to check that if
F is generic, then F ∩ A is generic. The following theorem states this in the
language of boolean values.
Theorem 9 Suppose R is a reductive PS and A is a boolean subsystem of R.
Then for all S ⊆ A
[[(
∨
P∈SG(Pˇ ))∨(
∨
P∈S⊥G(Pˇ ))]] = 1, (27)
where S⊥ = {P ∈ A | (∀Q ∈ S)P |Q}.
PROOF. This is a straightforward generalization of (20), which is the special
case of (27) obtained by letting A = {0, P,∼P, 1} and S = {P}.
(27) is equivalent to
[[
∧
P∈S∪S⊥∼G(Pˇ )]] = 0.
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Using Theorem 7 and the fact that conditions in PR are by definition closed
under general meet, we rewrite the left side as
⋂
P∈S∪S⊥
{p ∈ P | (∼P ) ∈ p}= {p ∈ P | (∀P ∈ S ∪ S⊥) (∼P ) ∈ p}
= {p ∈ P | (
∧
P∈S∪S⊥ ∼P ) ∈ p}
= {p ∈ P | (∼
∨
P∈S∪S⊥ P ) ∈ p}.
Since
∨
(S ∪ S⊥) = 1 this proves the theorem. ✷
We close this section with some observations and questions. It is easy to see
that any boolean PS, i.e., any PA, is reductive. As noted above, not all PSs
are reductive; however, at least one physically interesting system is reductive.
Consider a pure spin system with spin s = 1
2
, by which we mean a system with
statevector space C2s+1 = C2 whose observables are the angular momentum
operators La, where a is a direction in R3, and La measures the angular
momentum in that direction. The binary observables are the operators P a,S,
where S ⊆ {−1
2
, 1
2
}, and P a,S is 1 for La-eigenstates with eigenvalue in S and 0
for La-eigenstates with eigenvalue not in S. If a and a′ are distinct directions
not opposite to one another, the only time a relation of the form P a,S ≤ P a
′,S′
can hold is if either S = ∅, i.e., P a,S = 0, or S ′ = {−1
2
, 1
2
}, i.e., P a
′,S′ = 1.
It follows immediately that R is reductive. This is a rather trivial example
in that the minimal elements of R in this case form a dense set, and every
generic filter G on PR is therefore principal, i.e., for some (necessarily minimal)
q ∈ PR, G = {p ∈ PR | p ≥ q}. We may therefore dispense with the whole
machinery of generic filters in the 2-dimensional case: a pseudoclassical state
is any function that selects one member from each (unordered) pair {P,∼P}
of complementary propositions, as long as it selects 1 from {0, 1}.
Are there more interesting examples of reductive PSs? Is the system of position
and momentum measurements on a quantum particle in one dimension reduc-
tive? (This is known to be false for a particle in two or more dimensions[6].)
In general, how widespread is the reduction property?
In Sec. 4.3 we saw how to define a maximally contextual hidden-variables
model for a PS. Is there a natural notion of a minimally contextual hidden-
variables model for a system R, perhaps using reductive subsystems of R?
5.3 Comment on a result of Malley
Malley[9] has recently shown that certain assumptions regarding a hidden-
variables model for a Hilbert space of dimension at least 3 imply that all
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propositions in the relevant PS commute. The setting for this result (slightly
and inessentially modified to conform with the conventions of this paper)
consists of a PS R; a set Λ of hidden-variables states, which by virtue of
assumptions HV(a) and HV(b) of [9] may be identified with semifilters on R;
and a countably complete algebra B of subsets of Λ. It is implicit in [9] that
B contains the sets FP for all P ∈ R, where FP is the set of semifilters on R
that contain P . If ψ is a statevector then the expectation Exp(P ;ψ) of P for
ψ is given by ‖Pψ‖2/‖ψ‖2 for P ∈ R. The map P 7→ E(P ) = Exp(P ;ψ) is a
probability measure on R, i.e.,
E(1)= 1, (28)
E(
∨
n∈ω Pn)=
∑
n∈ω E(P ), (29)
for any family 〈Pn | n ∈ ω〉 of pairwise orthogonal propositions. Note that
since P can only have the values 0 and 1, Exp(P ;ψ) is the probability that
a measurement of P on the state represented by ψ has the value 1. If T is
a statistical ensemble of such states the expectation Exp(P ;T ) of P for the
ensemble is the corresponding weighted average of Exp(P ;ψ) over the ensem-
ble. Clearly, (28) and (29) are satisfied for E(T ) = Exp(P ;T ). By Gleason’s
theorem[7], if R consists of all propositions for a Hilbert space of dimension
at least 3 then (28) and (29) imply that for some positive trace-class operator
D with trD = 1, for all P ∈ R,
E(P ) = tr(DP ).
D is the density operator for the ensemble.
A statistical ensemble of pseudoclassical states is a probability measure µ
on a suitable countably complete algebra A of sets of pseudoclassical states.
The sets in A represent questions “posable” of the (states in the) ensemble.
Regarding pseudoclassical states as suitably generic filters on PR, we have seen
that posable questions may be identified with elements of the regular algebra
Reg PR of PR. Hence, a pseudoclassical ensemble may be identified with a
unit measure µ on Reg PR. The elements of Reg PR are literally regular sets of
complete semifilters on R, but as we have seen, each may be identified with
its union, which is a semifilter—typically not complete. Extending Def. 19, we
define [S] to be ⌈Scsf⌉, i.e., the set of complete semifilters that include the
complete semifilter generated by S, which is just the set of complete semifilters
that include S. Note that for P ∈ R, Def. 19 defines [P ] to be [{P}]. As we
have seen, if R is reductive, PR is separative, so the sets [S] are regular.
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If a pseudoclassical ensemble µ is to mimic the ordinary-state ensemble with
density operator D, then for each P ∈ R
µ([P ]) = tr(DP ).
Does this give us any guidance as to the measure of sets S ⊆ R consisting of
more than one proposition? In particular, what can we say about µ([{P,Q}])?
Suppose we have an ordinary-state ensemble with density operator D, and
suppose P is a proposition. We may create a new ensemble by executing a
measurement of P on each system of the first ensemble (or on a representative
sample of it) and only keeping the systems that give P = 1—in other words,
applying P as a filter. It is easily shown that the density of the new ensemble
is PDP/ tr(DP )—the von Neumann conditional density. 10 The expectation
of Q for this new ensemble is tr(PDPQ)/ tr(DP ), or, as it may be written,
tr(DPQP )/ tr(DP ), using the identity tr(AB) = tr(BA). This may be re-
garded as the probability of Q (i.e., Q = 1) conditioned on P (i.e., P = 1).
Analogously, if we first filter with Q and then measure P , the expectation is
tr(DQPQ)/ tr(DQ), which is the probability of P conditioned on Q. If the
filtering operation did not change the state of system being filtered, then we
could conclude that the joint probability of P and Q is given by tr(DPQP )—
which is the probability that P is found to be true and then Q is found to be
true—as well as by tr(DQPQ), which is the probability that Q is found to be
true and then P is found to be true. It follows from this assumption that
tr(DPQP ) = tr(DQPQ).
Malley[9] shows that this identity for all density operators D implies that
P and Q commute. Since a pseudoclassical ensemble µ does have to assign
a measure to P∧Q (it is µ({P,Q}) in the present terminology), it would
appear that such ensembles exist only for boolean propositional systems, i.e.,
for propositional algebras, which is the strongest possible no-hidden-variables
conclusion.
The argument of course depends on the assumption that the joint probabil-
ity µ({P,Q}) is given in terms of the von Neumann conditional density. The
rationale for this choice seems to be that since any proposition has a definite
value for any pseudoclassical state, we may filter an ensemble by a proposi-
tion without changing the (states of the) elements of the ensemble. Without
going into an analysis of the theory of measurement in a hidden-variables
model[2,11,5], it seems quite plausible that subjecting a pseudoclassical state
10 This is derived in Section IV.3 of [14] and essentially stated on p. 341, albeit with-
out the normalization factor. Much of von Neumann’s treatment of density operators
is in terms of “relative probability”, which does not require a total probability of 1.
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F to an interaction with an observer O that may be regarded as a measure-
ment of a proposition P , and then filtering on the basis of that measurement,
which amounts to “collapsing the wave packet”, will yield a result from which
the answer to ‘Q ∈ F ?’, for Q not commuting with P , cannot be inferred.
At any rate, the assumption of the applicability of the von Neumann formula
seems to require some justification.
Given the importance of statistical ensembles for the theory of measurement in
ordinary quantum theory and, by extension, in the theory of hidden-variables
models, it would be desirable to have an informative characterization of mea-
sures on Reg PR for a propositional system R. In particular, given the positive
results of the present paper for the case of reductive systems, it is natural
to ask what are the implications of the reduction property for this class of
measures.
A concrete example may serve to highlight the issues involved here. Consider
the simple PS R = {0, P,∼P,Q,∼Q, 1}, where P and Q do not commute. PR
consists of the complete semifilters
{1},
{P, 1}, {∼P, 1}, {Q, 1}, {∼Q, 1},
{P,Q, 1}, {∼P,Q, 1}, {P,∼Q, 1}, {∼P,∼Q, 1} .
The semifilters in the last row are the maximal semifilters and represent the
pseudoclassical states for this system. The algebra Reg PR of regular subsets of
PR is atomic. Its atoms (i.e., minimal nonzero elements) are the sets consisting
of a single maximal semifilter, viz.,
{{P,Q, 1}}, {{∼P,Q, 1}}, {{P,∼Q, 1}}, {{∼P,∼Q, 1}},
and every element of Reg PR is a join of these. For a proposition, say P , the
corresponding element of Reg PR is the set of maximal filters containing P ,
viz.,
{{P, 1}, {P,Q, 1}, {P,∼Q, 1}}.
Any assignment of non-negative values µP,Q, µ∼P,Q, µP,∼Q, µ∼P,∼Q to the atoms
such that
µP,Q + µ∼P,Q + µP,∼Q + µ∼P,∼Q = 1
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defines a measure on Reg PR. With this assignment we have
µ(Q) µ(∼Q)
q q
µ(P ) = µP,Q + µP,∼Q
+ +
µ(∼P ) = µ∼P,Q + µ∼P,∼Q
There are no necessary relations among these measures beyond the above; and
if D is a density operator such that µ(P ) = trDP and µ(Q) = trDQ, there
is no formula involving D, P , and Q that necessarily gives µP,Q, etc.
6 Models of set theory and the method of forcing
6.1 Formal language and logic
Prop. 1 has so far been our sole engine for generating generic filters, and the
hypothesis of the countability of S in that theorem has accounted for the
restriction of our conclusions to sets C consisting of countably many Borel
sets. This restriction is a bit awkward, and it is also somewhat unsatisfying in
that the meaning of ‘pseudoclassical’—which resides in the set S—depends on
the set C of “posable questions”. For a proper physical theory it is preferable
that ‘pseudoclassical’ have an absolute meaning.
We have seen how to develop the theory in terms of boolean values of expres-
sions without reference to existence of generic filters, and we might leave it
at this. We would then regard a physical system S with propositional system
R = RS as having a single pseudoclassical state for each boolean subsystem
P of R, of which only boolean-valued (specifically Reg PP-valued) statements
can be made. The “hiddenness” of this state is embodied in the logic appro-
priate to it. Pseudoclassical states in this sense are not states in the usual
sense, according to which S has many states that it can be in, and it is only
S-in-a-particular-state that has physical reality; S, like all physical systems,
being an abstract entity in terms of which we understand relationships among
physical states. If pseudoclassical states are to be states in this sense then
their corresponding filters must exist in an appropriate mathematical sense, a
sense that we now explore.
The issue of the existence of generic filters is a matter of some delicacy that is
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most naturally addressed in the context of models of set theory. The purpose
of this section is to present the relevant mathematical concepts and to show
their position within the broader context of mathematical logic and set theory.
Familiarity with the related topics in the appendix is assumed. A strictly
proper presentation of this part of mathematics is necessarily very formal, and
we have applied a relatively relaxed standard of exposition here, consistent—
one hopes—with the demands of clarity. [8] provides a thorough treatment of
the subject. Section 6.4 summarizes the ontology of pseudoclassical states in
terms of generic filters.
A formal language consists of expressions formed from relation and operation
symbols, variables, logical connectives (corresponding to ‘not’, ‘and’, etc.),
and quantifiers (corresponding to ‘for all’ and ‘there exists’). The variables,
logical connectives, and quantifiers are common to all formal languages. All
the languages we consider will also have a special binary relation symbol ‘=’,
the intended interpretation of which is identity. The remaining relation and
operation symbols are particular to a given language. The language of set
theory, for example, has one relation symbol in addition to ‘=’, viz., the binary
symbol ‘∈’.
Operation symbols (which are interpreted as functions) can always be elim-
inated in favor of relations, and we will largely limit our remarks to purely
relational languages, although we will find it convenient occasionally to con-
sider languages with constant symbols, i.e., operation symbols of rank 0, which
are interpreted as functions that take no arguments—in other words as con-
stants.
Suppose L is a relational language with n relation symbols ρ0, . . . , ρn−1 (in
addition to ‘=’). A class structure S = (U,R0, . . . , Rn−1) for L is a class
U together with relations R0, . . . , Rn−1 on U that correspond to ρ0, . . . , ρn−1
in terms of rank (i.e., unary, binary, etc.). ‘=’ is always interpreted as the
identity relation {〈a, a〉 | a ∈ U}. S = (U,R0, . . . , Rn−1) a set structure iff
U is a set (i.e., not a proper class), or, equivalently, S is a set. The term
structure unqualified means set structure. A class structure S provides an
interpretation of the expressions of L whereby a formula φ(x0, . . . , xn−1) with
the free variables shown is either true or false when x0, . . . , xn−1 are set equal
to a0, . . . , an−1, respectively—a0, . . . , an−1 being any members of U—and we
say that φ is or is not satisfied at 〈a0, . . . , an−1〉 accordingly.
Definition 22 We write
S |= φ[a0, . . . , an−1] (30)
for ‘φ is satisfied at 〈a0, . . . , an−1〉 when its relation and operation symbols are
interpreted according to S’. |= is the satisfaction relation.
For a given formula φ there is an obvious way to express S |= φ[a0, . . . , an−1]
as a formula with the free variables S and 〈a0, . . . , an−1〉: we just replace the
relation and operation symbols in φ by their interpretations in S, replace the
free variables v0, . . . , vn−1 of φ by a0, . . . , an−1 in order, and restrict the quan-
tifiers in φ to |S|. Let φˆ be this formula. Its free variables are S, a0, . . . , an−1,
and it defines the binary relation
· |= φ[·].
Note that we do not obtain in this way a single formula for the ternary relation
|=—there is no way to combine all the formulas φˆ into a single formula θ with
the additional free variable φ, if for no other reason than that their quanti-
fier depth—i.e., the maximum number of alternations of quantifier occurring
along any branch of the tree of subformulas created when φ is parsed—can be
arbitrarily large, while the quantifier depth of θ is some (finite) number.
Note also, however, that φˆ is only one way to define · |= φ[·]. If we restrict S
to (set) structures, there is a formula θ as above. Very briefly one shows by
induction that partial satisfaction relations exist for all finite sets of formulas
and that all such relations agree on any formula in their common domain for
every assignment of its variables. S |= φ[a0, . . . , an−1] is then defined by either
of the following formulas:
(1) There exists a partial satisfaction relation for φ and all its subformulas
that contains 〈φ, 〈a0, . . . , an−1〉〉.
(2) Every partial satisfaction relation for φ and all its subformulas contains
〈φ, 〈a0, . . . , an−1〉〉.
If we have the axiom of infinity we can show that there is a unique total
satisfaction relation for any (set) S, so we could then define S |= ·[·] to be
that relation. Note that if S is a proper class structure the partial satisfaction
relations are also proper classes, so we cannot quantify over them to formulate
either of formulas (1) and (2) (nor can we show that a total satisfaction relation
exists with the axiom of infinity).
To summarize: In the context of (set) structures, ‘|=’ denotes a single formula,
which may be any of those above. In the context of class structures, there is
no such formula, and for a given φ, ‘S |= φ[a0, . . . , an−1]’ refers to the formula
φˆ = φˆ(S, 〈a0, . . . , an−1〉), whose free variables are S and 〈a0, . . . , an−1〉 and
whose quantifier depth increases with that of φ. We will largely confine our
attention to set structures.
A sentence is a formula with no free variables and is either satisfied or not
satisfied by a structure S, i.e., it is either true or false for S. A theory is a set
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of sentences.
Definition 23 If S is an L-structure and T is an L-theory, we say that S
models T or S is a model of T, written S |= T, iff S |= σ for all σ ∈ T.
Definition 24 We say that a theory T entails a sentence σ iff for any struc-
ture S, if S |= T then S |= σ. We say that T proves σ, T ⊢ σ, iff σ follows
from sentences in T by the usual rules of deduction.
This definition of ‘entails’ is the usual one in logic and differs from the ad hoc
definition given in Section 5. Logical entailment has the reduction property,
i.e., reductio ad absurdum is a valid principle for entailment. For suppose T
is a theory and σ is a sentence and T ∪ {¬σ} entails σ, i.e., every model of
T∪{¬σ} also models σ. Then there are no models of T∪{¬σ}, so every model
of T satisfies σ, i.e., T entails σ.
Note that while the meaning of ‘entails’ is absolute, the meaning of ‘proves’
depends on the “rules of deduction”. It is nice if ‘entails’ and ‘proves’ are
synonymous; in other words, if
T ⊢ σ ⇐⇒ T entails σ. (31)
The =⇒ direction is the correctness property of the deductive system with
respect to which ‘⊢’ is defined. The⇐= direction is the completeness property.
A system of deduction that is not correct is of little use. On the other hand,
systems of deduction that are not complete have generated some interest,
particularly intuitionistic systems that reject the law of the excluded middle,
i.e., the axiom schema (φ or ¬φ) for all formulas φ, where ‘¬φ’ means ‘not φ’.
Nevertheless,
Proposition 10 Completeness theorem the usual deductive systems are
complete.
This is Go¨del’s completeness theorem. The (essentially unique) correct com-
plete deductive system is the familiar system of ordinary deductive discourse,
called classical logic, and this is the system to which we refer (and which we
use!) in this paper.
Suppose T is a theory and for some sentence σ, both σ and ¬σ are theorems of
T. Then we can derive any sentence from T. As we have assumed a complete
correct deductive system, this is equivalent to the corresponding statement
for entailment: if every model of T satisfies both σ and ¬σ, then there are no
models of T, so every model of T satisfies everything, so T entails everything.
Of course we can prove any individual instance of this within any of the
various descriptions of classical logic. Letting φ be the conjunction of the
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premises in T used to prove the given σ and ¬σ, this amounts to proving
((φ =⇒ σ) & (φ =⇒ ¬σ)) =⇒ (φ =⇒ θ) for the given θ. Any reasonable
formulation of classical logic will permit the construction of a short proof
schema into which φ, σ, and θ may be inserted to obtain a proof of the given
instance.
Definition 25 A theory T is inconsistent iff all sentences are theorems of T,
equivalently, if σ and ¬σ are both theorems of T for some σ. Otherwise T is
consistent.
The completeness theorem may be stated as follows.
Proposition 11 Any consistent theory has a model.
Note that ‘model’, like ‘structure’, means set model unless qualified with
‘class’.
Note that entailment is defined in terms of models, which are in general infini-
tary objects, while inference is defined entirely in terms of linguistic expres-
sions and rules of inference, which are finitary. (The infinitary languages of
Section 3.2.2 are special constructs that do not reflect ordinary mathematical
discourse.) The great power of the completeness property is that it permits
the former to be expressed in terms of the latter.
Definition 26 Suppose T is an L-theory. T is deductively closed iff for all
L-sentences σ, T ⊢ σ =⇒ σ ∈ T . T , the (deductive) closure of T , is the
smallest closed theory that includes T , which is defined explicitly as the set of
theorems of T .
Of special interest is ∅, the closure of the empty theory, because it is included in
any closed theory. The members of ∅ are the theorems of pure logic, which are
called tautologies because they are true by virtue of their form, independent
of the interpretation of the relation symbols of L. For example, if L has two
unary relation symbols R0 and R1, then
(∀x (R0(x) =⇒ R1(x)) & ∃xR0(x)) =⇒ ∃xR1(x)
is a tautology of L.
Proofs are finitary things, and a proof can utilize only finitely many premises;
hence, if T ⊢ σ then for some finite Σ ⊆ T, Σ ⊢ σ. Let 〈σ0, . . . , σn−1〉 be an
enumeration of Σ. Then
(σ0 & σ1 & . . . & σn−1) =⇒ σ (32)
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is a tautology.
Note that one can easily program a computer, given unlimited memory ca-
pacity, to generate exactly the tautologies simply by systematically generating
all proofs without premises. 11 We call programmable procedures in this sense
effective or recursive procedures. We will consider two types of recursive proce-
dure in this discussion. The first type accepts as input a sentence, presented as
a string of symbols in whatever (effective) representation suits our fancy. The
procedure either never halts, or it halts with a specific output value, which in
this discussion is 0 or 1. We call the corresponding function recursive. We say
that a recursive function f halts for σ iff f(σ) is defined, i.e., σ ∈ dom f . A
recursive function is total iff it halts for every input.
A set S of sentences is recursive iff there is a total recursive function f such
that for all σ, σ ∈ S ⇐⇒ f(σ) = 1. In other words, there is a recursive
procedure that always gives the right answer (1 for ‘yes’ and 0 for ‘no’) to the
question ‘σ ∈ S?’.
A set S of sentences is recursively enumerable iff for some recursive f , S =
dom f . This term originates in the consideration of the second type of effective
procedure. A procedure of this type does not accept an input: it simply runs,
occasionally putting out a value, which in this case is a sentence. We say that
such a procedure enumerates a set S of sentences iff it never outputs a sentence
not in S and for all σ ∈ S it eventually outputs σ. It is not hard to show that
a set is recursively enumerable as defined above iff it can be enumerated in
this way, i.e., recursively.
Note that a recursive set is recursively enumerable, and if a set and its com-
plement are both recursively enumerable then they are both recursive.
Since ∅ is recursively enumerable, it is natural to inquire whether it is recursive.
The answer is that it is iff all the relation symbols of L other than ‘=’ have
rank 1 or 0 (a relation of rank 0 is a primitive proposition that is either true or
false in a given interpretation). All theories of intrinsic interest are in languages
with at least one relation symbol other than ‘=’ of rank greater than 1, and
Proposition 12 Undecidability theorem of Church for these, ∅ is
not recursive.
11 It is not to be thought that such a procedure would necessarily facilitate the quest
for understandable mathematical theorems. Most such procedures generate an in-
conceivable number of “junk theorems”, which are utterly beyond comprehension—
not because they are deep, but because they are junk. Of course, there is an effective
theorem generator that is a veritable cornucopia of (humanly) understandable theo-
rems: the human mathematics community.
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In other words there is no effective way to decide whether a sentence is a
tautology.
A theory T is complete iff for all sentences σ, either σ ∈ T or (¬σ) ∈ T . 12
A consistent complete theory need not be recursively enumerable—indeed, if
L has a relation symbol of rank greater than 1, there are uncountably many
complete theories, so, as there are only countably many effective procedures,
most complete theories are not recursively enumerable.
Nevertheless there are some interesting theories that are complete, consistent,
and recursively enumerable. All these theories have in common the feature
that they are unable to interpret the grammatical and logical structure of
formal languages—unable to talk about logic, as it were. Go¨del’s celebrated
incompleteness theorem states that
Proposition 13 First incompleteness theorem any consistent recur-
sively enumerable theory that is “able to talk about logic” is incomplete.
If T is recursively enumerable, so is its deductive closure. To prove the incom-
pleteness theorem for a recursively enumerable theory T, which we assume to
be deductively closed, we suppose that f recursively enumerates T, and we
form the sentence ‘this sentence is not generated by f ’, which is to say,
this sentence is not a theorem of T, (33)
and we show that this is not a theorem of T.
We have to do a deal of rather meticulous work to construct a sentence that
may be regarded as saying (33) and to show that such a sentence is indeed
not a theorem of T (assuming T is consistent), but the reward is well worth
the effort. By an ingenious turn of the screw, we can go on to show that
Proposition 14 Second incompleteness theorem if T is a consistent
recursively enumerable theory that is able to talk about logic then the sentence
T is consistent (34)
is not a theorem of T.
Set theory is an example of a theory that can interpret logic, but it is far
richer in expression and deduction than is necessary (it is, after all, capable
of interpreting all of mathematics as we know it)—indeed, a relatively meager
12 The notion of completeness of a theory is essentially unrelated to the notion of
completeness of a system of deduction.
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fragment of the bare-bones theory of the natural numbers known as Peano
arithmetic is sufficient for this purpose.
The undecidability theorem of Church and the incompleteness theorem of
Go¨del have a common theme, which is also shared by the undecidability theo-
rem of Tarski, which states that if a theory T in a language L can talk about
logic and S is a model of T, then there is no formula φ in L such that for all
sentences σ in L,
S |= φ(σˆ) ⇐⇒ S |= σ, (35)
where σˆ is the canonical term in L for σ. Such a formula is called a truth
predicate for S, true of exactly the sentences that are true (as well as their
canonical terms) , and it can be used to construct a sentence σ such that
S |= (σ↔¬φ(σˆ)), which contradicts (35). σ is, in effect, the sentence uttered
by Epimenides the Cretan, who said ‘all Cretans are liars’, which has been
interpreted in such a way that it is true iff it is false. In our case σ is a
formulation of ‘this sentence is false’.
In a similar way we can use Richard’s paradox, as given in the last footnote
in Section 4 of [13], to prove that if S is a model of Peano arithmetic (PA),
there does not exist a formula δ(·, ·) in the language L of PA such that for all
formulas φ(·) of L,
(S |= δ[φˆ, n]) ⇐⇒ (φ is uniquely satisfied by n in S), (36)
where φˆ is the Go¨del number of φ. Note that the nonexistence of such a δ
implies the nonexistence of a full Tarski truth predicate, but not obviously
vice versa. If there were such a δ we could use Richard’s schema to derive a
contradiction.
Arithmetic is not able to talk about models in general, because it can only
represent finitary objects, and models are generally infinite. Set theory, on the
other hand, is able to discuss models. For the sake of definiteness consider
the Zermelo-Fraenkel theory, ZF, which is the standard axiomatic theory of
sets to be defined presently. It can discuss models of theories and it can prove
that if ZF has a model then it is consistent, so by the incompleteness theorem,
assuming ZF (or at least the fragment of it that we make use of) is consistent
(and if it isn’t our work is as dust in the wind), then ZF cannot prove that a
model of ZF exists.
It is convenient nevertheless to frame the discussion of generic filters initially
in terms of models of set theory. Hence we must explicitly assume the existence
of a model of set theory. When we thoroughly understand generic extensions
of such models we will be able to dispense with this assumption. For now we
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need an even stronger assumption, viz., that there is a well-founded model of
ZF, i.e., a set model (M,E) for which the relation E is well-founded (a notion
to be defined presently).
6.2 Axiomatic set theory
We first develop a useful fragment of set theory. In doing this we will present
the axioms of set theory and a description of models of set theory. As discussed
in the appendix, the most general version of set theory allows for objects that
are not classes, which are referred to as urelements or atoms. From the stand-
point of set theory, atoms are regarded as structureless entities; all structure
is contained in the relations that hold among atoms and the sets constructed
from them. In the interest of simplicity we will emphasize the theory of classes
without atoms, but all our remarks apply mutatis mutandis to the theory with
atoms. We will use ‘set theory’ as a generic term for all such theories.
A model of set theory is best viewed hierarchically. For simplicity we will
assume that the collection of all atoms (if we permit atoms) is a set (as opposed
to a proper class or not a class at all).
Definition 27 Let V0 be the set of atoms.
Let V1 = V0 ∪ PV0, where for any set X , PX
def
= the set consisting of the
subsets of X . Let V2 = V1 ∪ PV1, and continue ad infinitum to define Vn
for any natural number n. Recall that ω = {0, 1, . . .}. Let Vω
def
=
⋃
n∈ω Vn. We
continue this construction into the transfinite, defining Vω+1 = Vω ∪PVω, and
so on, where ω + 1 = ω ∪ {ω}, ω + 2 = (ω + 1) ∪ {ω + 1}, etc. The sets
0, 1, 2, . . . , ω, ω + 1, . . . that occur here are the von Neumann ordinals, which
we will presently discuss at greater length. In general,
Vα =


{x | x is an atom} if α = 0
Vβ ∪ PVβ if α = β + 1⋃
{Vβ | β ∈ α} if α is a limit ordinal.
(37)
To obtain the universe of pure sets we begin the above induction with V0 = ∅,
whether atoms are present or not.
The standard system of axioms for pure set theory is ZF, the Zermelo-Fraenkel
axioms. For the purpose of this article we will use a version of ZF that allows
for the possibility of proper classes without positing any axioms that assert
the existence of a class that is not also asserted to be a set. The corresponding
system that also allows atoms is ZFA. The corresponding systems with the
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axiom of choice are ZFC and ZFCA. The following discussion presents the
axioms of ZFA in the above sense, with the axiom of choice brought in as
necessary or convenient. As a convenience we will introduce proper classes by
definition and use them in such a way that they may always be eliminated in
favor of their definitions (suitably incorporated into expressions). In particular
V is defined to be the class of all sets. We will use the predicates Element,
Set, and Class for the several types of entities, and quantifiers will be qualified
by the subscripts E, S, C, according as they govern variables that range over
elements, sets, or classes, respectively. An unsubscripted quantifier indicates
a variable ranging over everything.
The first two axioms essentially define the three domain predicates:
(∀x, y)(x ∈ y =⇒ (Element(x) & Class(y)))
∀x ( Set(x) ⇐⇒ (Element(x) & Class(x))).
The existence axiom
∃Sxx = x (38)
states that there exists a set.
The extensionality axiom
∀CX, Y
(
X = Y ⇐⇒ (∀z (z ∈ X ⇐⇒ z ∈ Y ))
)
(39)
states that the identity of a class X is uniquely determined by the collection
{x | x ∈ X}, i.e., if two classes have the same members then they are identical,
i.e., they are the same class. 13 Note that only the reverse implication in (39)
need be stated. The forward direction is a tautology, i.e., a theorem of pure
logic with identity.
The comprehension axiom schema states, for each formula
φ(·, ·, . . . , ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+ 1 free
variables
),
that
13 Note that (39) only holds for classes. Urelements have no members, so (39) does
not hold if X and Y are distinct urelements. Note also that we do not have to
specify a domain for ‘z’; if z ∈ X then z is an element.
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∀z0, . . . , zn−1 ∀Sx ∃Sy ∀u
(
u ∈ y ⇐⇒ (40)
(u ∈ x & φ(u, z0, . . . , zn−1))
)
, (41)
or, somewhat informally, ‘if x is a set then {u ∈ x | φ(u, z0, . . . , zn−1)} is a
set for any formula φ and any z0, . . . , zn−1’. With the comprehension schema
we can turn Russell’s paradox to our advantage and show that V is a proper
class. For suppose to the contrary that it is a set and observe that Y = {u ∈
V | u /∈ u} is then a set and therefore in V . It is evident that if Y ∈ Y then
Y /∈ Y and vice versa, which is a contradiction (which is, after all, what a
paradox is).
It follows from the comprehension and existence axioms that there is a set
with no members, which by the axiom of extensionality is unique. We call the
empty set ‘∅’.
The pair axiom
∀Ex, y ∃Sz ∀w (w ∈ z ⇐⇒ (w = x or w = y)) (42)
states that for any elements x and y there is a set z such that x and y are
members of z and z has no other members. We denote this set by ‘{x, y}’, the
(unordered) pair of x and y; {x}
def
= {x, x} is the singleton of an element x.
The powerset axiom
∀Sx ∃Sy ∀w (w ∈ y ⇐⇒ (Set(w) & w ⊆ x) (43)
states that for any set x there is a set y such that the members of y are exactly
the subsets of x. We denote this set by ‘Px’, the powerset of x.
The union axiom
∀Sx ∃Sy ∀z (z ∈ y ⇐⇒ ∃w z ∈ w ∈ x) (44)
states that for any set x there exists a set y that consists of exactly the
members of members of x. We denote this set by ‘
⋃
x’, the union of x, or—in
terms perhaps more familiar—union of the members of x.
The replacement axiom schema states, for each formula
φ(·, ·, . . . , ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+ 2 free
variables
)
42
that
∀z0, . . . , zn−1 ∀Sx ∃Sy ∀Ev
v ∈ y ⇐⇒ (∃u ∈ x)
(
φ(u, v, z0, . . . , zn−1)
& ∀Ev
′ (φ(u, v′, z0, . . . , zn−1) =⇒ v
′ = v)
)
.
In other words, given a formula φ, if we fix z0, . . . , zn−1 and restrict our at-
tention to those u for which there is a unique v such that φ(u, v, z0, . . . , zn−1),
i.e., the functional part of φ(·, ·, z0, . . . , zn−1), which we will represent by ‘F (·)’,
then if we restrict u to range over a set x, F (u) also ranges over a set. 14
Using these axioms we can derive the existence of a rich variety of sets. We
have already derived the existence of a unique empty set ∅. We also denote this
set by ‘0’, a symbol that has other meanings in various settings. The intended
denotation of any instance of ‘0’ may usually be inferred from its context. In
(27), which defines V0 as the set of atoms, the intended denotation is ∅.
By the powerset, pair, and union axioms, V1 = V0 ∪ PV0 exists and is a set.
0 ∈ V1, as are all other sets of atoms. {0} is not in V1, but it is a subset
of V1 and is therefore in V2 = V1 ∪ PV1, along with all other sets of sets
of atoms. We define ‘1’ in this context to mean ‘{0}’. Similarly we define
‘2’ to mean ‘{0, 1} = {0, {0}} = {{}, {{}}}. Leaving aside the rest of the
universe for the moment, we continue in this vein to define an infinite sequence
0, 1 = {0}, 2 = {0, 1}, . . . , n = {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}, . . ., of sets such that each set
in the sequence is the set of elements in the sequence that precede it. We call
these sets the natural numbers or the finite ordinals. Using ‘+1’ to denote the
successor operation we have
n + 1 = n ∪ {n},
for all finite ordinals n.
Definition 28 A class X is transitive
def
⇐⇒
(∀x ∈ X) x ⊆ X.
14 Note that the comprehension axiom for φ, z0, . . . , zn−1, and x follows from the
replacement axiom for φ′, z0, . . . , zn−1, and x, where
φ′(u, v, z0, . . . , zn−1)
def
⇐⇒ φ(u, z0, . . . , zn−1) & u = v,
so the comprehension schema is redundant once we have the replacement schema;
nevertheless, it is conceptually and pedagogically useful to consider the comprehen-
sion schema separately.
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Definition 29 A class X is well-ordered by a binary relation ≺ iff it is
strictly linearly ordered by ≺ and every nonempty subset of X has a ≺-least
member. An ordinal is a transitive set that is well-ordered by ∈. We define Ω
to be the class of ordinals.
One can show that Ω is well-ordered by ∈, so it is a proper class, for if it were
a set then both Ω and Ω′ = Ω ∪ {Ω} would be sets well-ordered by ∈, i.e.,
ordinals, and would therefore both be in Ω, but {Ω,Ω′} is not strictly ordered
by ∈, as both Ω′ ∈ Ω and Ω ∈ Ω′, contradicting the fact that Ω is well-ordered,
a fortiori strictly ordered, by ∈.
Using the replacement axiom and the fact that Ω is well-ordered by ∈, one
can show that (37) defines a unique Vα for each ordinal α. We define VΩ to be
the class of all elements x such that x ∈ Vα for some α ∈ Ω. Clearly,
x ∈ VΩ =⇒ x ⊆ VΩ.
Conversely, given a set x ⊆ VΩ, we use the replacement axiom to show that
there exists α ∈ Ω such that x ⊆ Vα. It follows that x ∈ Vα+1. Hence, for any
set x,
x ⊆ VΩ =⇒ x ∈ VΩ. (45)
Definition 30 For x ∈ VΩ, we define ρ(x), the rank of x, to be the least
α ∈ Ω such that x ⊆ Vα. (Note that x ∈ Vα+1 \ Vα.)
Definition 31 Suppose E is a binary relation on a class X.
(1) For any Y ⊆ X, E←Y
def
= {x ∈ X | (∃y ∈ Y ) xE y}.
(2) E is extensional
def
⇐⇒ for all x, x′ ∈ X, if E←{x} = E←{x′} then x = x′.
(3) E is well-founded
def
⇐⇒
(a) for every for every x ∈ X, E←{x} is a set, and
(b) for every nonempty set Y ⊆ X there exists y ∈ Y such that E←{y}∩
Y = ∅.
The well-foundedness of a relation E on a class X allows for proof by induction
(specifically, E-induction), which consists of inferring that a formula φ holds
for any x ∈ X from the hypothesis that for any x ∈ X , φ holds for x if φ holds
for all y ∈ X such that yEx. To justify the method, we reason from the given
hypothesis as follows. Suppose φ fails for some x ∈ X . Use the infinity and
replacement axioms to show that there is a set Y ⊆ X such that x ∈ Y and
E←Y ⊆ Y . Use the comprehension axiom and the well-foundedness of E to
infer that there exists y ∈ Y such that ¬φ(y) and (∀y′ ∈ X)(y′Ey =⇒ φ(y′)),
which contradicts the hypothesis.
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Well-foundedness also permits definition by recursion (specifically, E-recursion),
in which a function f with domain X is defined at x ∈ X in terms of f(y) for
all y ∈ X such that yEx. Briefly, one shows by induction that for each x ∈ X ,
there exists a function F such that x ∈ domF and E← domF ⊆ domF and
F satisfies the recursion formula, whatever it may be. We then show that any
two such functions F agree at x, and we define f(x) to be this common value
for each x ∈ X . Then f satisfies the recursion formula throughout its domain,
which is X .
The special case of X = V Ω and E =∈ is of particular importance, and proof
by ∈-induction and definition by ∈-recursion are indispensable tools in set
theory.
The infinity axiom states that there is a set that contains every finite or-
dinal. 15 By the comprehension axiom there is therefore a set that contains
exactly the finite ordinals. We call this set ‘ω’. It then follows from the re-
placement axiom et al, that Vω =
⋃
{Vn | n ∈ ω} exists and is a set. We
can continue way beyond this point. ω + 1, ω + 2 = ω + 1 + 1, . . . , ω · 2 =
ω + ω, . . . , ω2 = ω · ω, . . . , ωω, and similarly describable sets barely begin to
suggest the complexity of just the countable members of this sequence.
The foundation or regularity axiom states that the membership relation
is well-founded—i.e., that any nonempty class X has a member x that has no
member in X .
Proposition 15 The foundation axiom implies that no set is a member of
itself, 16 and VΩ = V . In fact, the foundation axiom is equivalent to the latter
statement.
The foundation axiom brings the entire set-theoretical universe within the
scope of proof by ∈-induction and definition by ∈-recursion.
The axioms we have just listed, viz., existence, extensionality, comprehension,
pair, powerset, union, replacement, infinity, and foundation, constitute the
theory ZFA, the Zermelo-Fraenkel theory with atoms. If atoms are excluded
we have ZF.
The foundation axiom has a somewhat different character from the other ax-
ioms, which mostly say that for a particular sort of property that elements
might have, for any property of that sort there is a set that consists of exactly
15 For the purpose of this axiom we may take ‘finite ordinal’ to mean an ordinal α
such that each nonzero β ∈ α has an immediate ∈-precursor in α.
16 If x ∈ x, let y = {z ⊆ x | x ∈ z}, which is a set by the powerset and comprehension
axioms. Note that x ∈ y. By the foundation axiom, for some z ∈ y, z ∩ y = ∅. Since
z ∈ y, x ∈ z, and as we have just noted x ∈ y, which is a contradiction.
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the elements with that property. The other exception is the extensionality
axiom, whose purpose is more to say what we mean by ‘class’ than to say
anything about classes. The foundation axiom, on the other hand, may strike
one as a gratuitous limitation on the existence of sets—why shouldn’t there
be a set not in VΩ? One reason is that in applications of set theory—when we
are not concerned with sets in abstracto but rather with sets as they embody
and pertain to concepts that arise in other branches of mathematics and its
applications, including physics—sets outside VΩ do not naturally arise.
An occurrence of a variable in an expression is bound iff it falls within the
scope of a quantifier phrase that contains the variable; otherwise it is free.
Thus, for example, in ‘∀x(x ∈ y ⇐⇒ ∀y(y ∈ z =⇒ y ∈ x))’, the occurrences
of ‘x’ are both bound, and the second and third occurrences of ‘y’ are bound.
The first occurrence of ‘y’ is free. (Variable symbols in quantifier phrases are
not considered occurrences.) If φ and τ are respectively a formula and a term
in the language of set theory, φτ is defined as the formula obtained from φ by
restricting every bound variable in φ to τ . In other words, if u is a variable, the
quantifier phrases ∀u and ∃u are replaced by ∀u ∈ τ and ∃u ∈ τ . (If necessary
we first effect a change of bound variables in φ to variables that do not occur
in τ .) We call φτ the relativization of φ to τ .
In ZFA without the foundation axiom one can prove σVΩ for any sentence
σ ∈ ZFA, including the foundation axiom itself. In a sense, therefore, ZFA
without foundation incorporates ZFA. In particular, if ZFA without foundation
is consistent then ZFA is consistent. 17
The axiom of choice states that if x is a set of disjoint nonempty sets then
there exists a set y such that for all x′ ∈ x there exists a unique y′ ∈ y such
that y′ ∈ x′. There are a number of useful formulation of this axiom that are
equivalent (over ZFA). A particularly handy form is the statement that every
set can be well-ordered. It is known that if ZF is consistent then the axiom of
choice can be neither disproved nor proved in ZF (a fortiori not in ZFA); in
other words it is consistent with ZFA to assume either the axiom of choice or
its negation.
6.3 Models of set theory and generic extensions
Proposition 16 Theorem of ZFA Suppose E is an extensional well-founded
relation on a set X. Then there exists a unique transitive set Y and a unique
17Given a proof of a contradiction from ZFA we could construct a proof of a contra-
diction from ZFA− foundation by relativizing everything to VΩ. In this connection
it should be noted that by Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, Prop. 34, if ZFA is
consistent it is not capable of proving its own consistency.
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isomorphism of (X,E) to (Y,∈), i.e., a unique bijection j : X → Y such that
for all x, x′ ∈ X, xE x′ ⇐⇒ j(x) ∈ j(x′). We call Y the transitive collapse
of (X,E).
PROOF. The set Y and the isomorphism j are constructed by recursion
relative to E. ✷
Recall that ‘M |= T’ means that the structureM satisfies every sentence of the
theory T. We are particularly interested in structures of the form M = (M,E)
that model ZFA. In the case that E is just the membership relation on M , we
may omit to mention it.
Let ConT be the sentence ‘T is consistent’. Although we have indicated that it
is a theorem of ZFA, the following is a theorem of any theory that can interpret
logic, including the weak theory of arithmetic alluded to earlier. All we need
for the present purpose, however, is that it is a theorem of ZFA.
Proposition 17 Theorem of ZFA Suppose ZFA∪{ConZFA} is consistent.
Then
ZFA 6⊢ (ConZFA =⇒ there is a transitive set model of ZFA).
PROOF. Suppose ZFA∪{ConZFA} is consistent, and suppose toward a con-
tradiction that
ZFA ⊢ (ConZFA =⇒ there is a transitive set model of ZFA), (46)
i.e., ZFA∪{ConZFA} ⊢ there is a transitive set model of ZFA. We will describe
a proof of Con(ZFA∪{ConZFA}) from ZFA∪{ConZFA}, the existence of which
contradicts the incompleteness theorem.
Arguing in ZFA∪ {ConZFA} for the duration of this paragraph, we first show
that there is a transitive set model (M,∈) of ZFA, which we can do by hy-
pothesis. Let N ⊆ M be Vω in the sense of M . It is straightforward to
show that N is the true Vω. ConZFA is a statement about finitary objects,
represented as members of Vω, so ConZFA =⇒ (M,∈) |= ConZFA. Hence,
(M,∈) |= ZFA ∪ {ConZFA}, from which it follows that ZFA ∪ {ConZFA} is
consistent.
As stated above, the existence of the proof just described contradicts the
incompleteness theorem, so our assumption (46) is false. ✷
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By the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem—the proof of which is quite straightforward—
for any set M , (M,∈) has a countable elementary substructure, i.e., a subset
N such that for all formulas φ(x0, . . . , xn−1) with the free variables shown, and
all a0, . . . , an−1 ∈ N ,
((N,∈) |= φ[a0, . . . , an−1]) ⇐⇒ ((M,∈) |= φ[a0, . . . , an−1]).
Thus, if M is a transitive set model of ZFA then (N,∈) is a countable well-
founded model of ZFA, and its transitive collapse is a countable transitive
model of ZFA. Thus the hypothesis of the existence of a countable transitive
model of ZFA is no stronger than the hypothesis of the existence of a transitive
set model of ZFA.
In the following discussion M will be supposed to be a transitive class model
of ZFA. We allow the possibility that M = V , the class of all sets. As noted
above, we cannot treat proper class structures as we do set structures vis-a`-
vis the satisfaction relation. In particular, if M is a proper class we cannot
actually even “say” that (M,∈) |= ZFA; rather, for each axiom σ of ZFA we
have to say that (M,∈) |= σ, i.e., that σ holds relative to M . In general we
cannot do this any more simply than by asserting σM , the relativization of σ
to M . Since ZFA has axioms with arbitrarily large quantifier depth (by virtue
of the schemas of replacement and comprehension, which are stated for all
formulas) no single formula can say that (M,∈) |= ZFA. We treat ‘M |= ZFA’
as a schema whenM is a proper class. Clearly V |= σ is just σ for any sentence
σ.
Suppose P = (P,≤) ∈ M is a separative partial order with a maximum
element, 1. A filter F on P is M-generic iff F meets every dense subset of P
that is in M . Leaving aside the question of existence for the moment, suppose
G is an M-generic filter on P. We define a map x 7→ xG from M into V by
induction on the rank of x according to
xG
def
=


x if x ∈ V M0
{yG | (∃p ∈ G)[y, p] ∈ x} otherwise.
(47)
Let
M [G]
def
= {xG | x ∈M}. (48)
Clearly M [G] is transitive.
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For a ∈M we define aˇ by induction on the rank of a according to
aˇ
def
=


a if a ∈ V M0
{[bˇ, 1] | b ∈ a} otherwise.
Since any filter on P contains 1 (the maximum element of P), it follows by
induction on the rank of a ∈M that for any filter G on P
aˇG = a. (49)
Thus M ⊆M [G].
Note that
{[pˇ, p] | p ∈ P}G = G (50)
for any filter G on P. Hence G ∈M [G].
In general, G /∈M . In particular, if P is atomless, which is the only interesting
case, then for any filter F ∈ M , P \ F is a dense subset of P and is in M ; as
F does not meet P \F , F is not M-generic. We are assuming G is M-generic,
so G /∈ M , and M [G] properly includes M .
We are interested in the theory of M[G] = (M [G],∈, M˜ , . . . , xˆ, . . .), where
(1) ∈M[G] is the membership relation restricted to M [G],
(2) M˜ is a predicate symbol with M˜M =M , and
(3) for each x ∈M , xˆ is a constant symbol with xˆM = xG.
Let LM,P be the language of M[G] in the usual sense except that we allow
conjunction
∧
E and disjunction
∨
E of arbitrary sets of formulas E ∈M .
LM,P differs from the language LP of Section 4.2 in several ways:
(1) LM,P has the binary relation symbol ‘∈’ (in addition to ‘=’, which is in
all languages by our convention);
(2) LM,P has the predicate symbol M˜ ;
(3) the constant symbols of LM,P are indexed by M , as opposed to |P|; and
(4) conjunction and disjunction are restricted to sets E of formulas such that
E ∈M , whereas in LP they are unrestricted.
For the sake of definiteness we provide a specific implementation of this gram-
mar, which we have so far described only in the abstract. The details of this
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implementation are unimportant as long as all syntactical relationships are
simply definable in (M,P,∈).
We let
xˆ
def
= [0, x],
for all x ∈M . For each a ∈M we let
a˜
def
= ˆˇa = [0, aˇ].
By virtue of (49), a˜M[G] = a for all a ∈ M . Note that M˜ does not fall under
this definition since M /∈ M , and our use of this notation is a mnemonic
convenience based on the fact that ‘M˜ ’ always denotesM . We need not assign
a specific denotation to ‘M˜ ’ as it only occurs in expressions of the form ‘M˜(τ)’,
which are defined below as elements of M .
We let
G
def
= {[pˇ, p] | p ∈ |P|}̂= [0, {[pˇ, p] | p ∈ P}].
By virtue of (50), GM[G] = G for any filter G on P. Note that G is in the list
. . . , xˆ, . . . of constant symbols for LM,P, so we do not have to list it separately
as we did in the description of LP in Section 4.2.
We define the variables of LM,P to be sets of the form [1, n] for n ∈ ω. We
refer to the constants and the variables collectively as the terms of LM,P. The
primitive formulas are those that state the membership of a term in M or
a relationship of identity or membership between terms. We represent the
operations of forming the latter formulas by the boldface versions of the usual
relation symbols. Specifically, we let
M˜(τ)
def
= [2, τ ]
τ=τ ′
def
= [3, [τ, τ ′]]
τ∈τ ′
def
= [4, [τ, τ ′]].
We will also write ‘τ∈M˜ ’ for ‘M˜(τ)’. Similarly we use the boldface version of
the usual logical connectives to indicate appropriate formula-forming opera-
tions. For example, using ‘φ’ and ‘φ′’ to represent arbitrary formulas—which
are, bear in mind, elements of M—we let
∼φ def= [5, φ]
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φ∧φ′
def
= [6, [φ, φ′]]
φ∨φ′
def
= [7, [φ, φ′]]
φ→φ′
def
= [8, [φ, φ′]]
φ↔φ′
def
= [9, [φ, φ′]],
where ∼, ∧, ∨, →, and ↔ correspond respectively to negation, conjunction,
disjunction, implication, and equivalence.
Quantifier expressions may be handled similarly. For example, using ‘φ’ again
to represent an arbitrary formula, and ‘u’ to represent an arbitrary variable,
we let
∀u φ
def
= [10, [u, φ]]
∃u φ
def
= [11, [u, φ]].
As a concrete example, take the existence axiom. As an element of LM,P, it is
∃u u=u, where u is a variable, i.e., u = [1, n] for some n ∈ ω. For definiteness,
suppose u = [1, 0]. Then
∃u u=u = [11, [[1, 0], [2, [[1, 0], [1, 0]]]]]. (51)
Note the difference between ‘=’ and ‘=’ in (51). The former denotes the
LM,P-formula-forming operation τ, τ ′ 7→ [2, [τ, τ ′]], while the latter asserts the
identity of ∃u u=u and [11, [[1, 0], [2, [[1, 0], [1, 0]]]]]. We refer to LM,P as the
object language in this context, as it is the object of our consideration.
[11, [[1, 0], [2, [[1, 0], [1, 0]]]]] is an element of the object language, which we
see here is an LM,P-formula. Eq. 51, on the other hand, is an element of the
metalanguage for this discussion, the language we are using to talk about the
object language—in other words, the language in which this paper is written.
The 30-character string ‘[11, [[1, 0], [2, [[1, 0], [1, 0]]]]]’ is a term of the meta-
language that denotes the set [11, [[1, 0], [2, [[1, 0], [1, 0]]]]], which is a LM,P-
formula.
We now define corresponding notions of forcing and boolean value for sentences
of LM,P related by
[[σ]]M,P = {p ∈ P | p M,P σ}. (52)
The valuation algebra is the regular algebra of P as constructed in (M,P,∈).
We usually may omit the distinguishing superscript on ‘’ and ‘[[·]]’ without
loss of clarity.
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The definition is designed to give the following theorem.
Proposition 18 Suppose M is a transitive class model of ZFA, P = (P,≤
) ∈ M is a separative partial order, σ is a sentence of LM,P, and G is an
M-generic filter on P. Then M[G] |= σ iff (∃p ∈ G)p  σ.
The following corollary is easily derived using the definability of  in (M,P,∈)
and fact that p  σ ⇐⇒ p ∈ [[σ]], [[σ]] being a regular subset of P.
Corollary 19 Suppose M is a transitive model of ZFA, P = (P,≤) ∈M is a
separative partial order, and for all p ∈ P , there exists an M-generic filter G
containing p. Then for any sentence σ of LM,P, p  σ iff for all M-generic G
containing p, M[G] |= σ.
Remark It should be noted that the existence hypothesis in the corollary is
not inconsistent with M being a proper class. For example
(M [G],∈) |=M is a proper class and G is M-generic.
It is convenient to give the proof of the proposition concurrently with the
definitions. We will use  and [[·]] interchangeably according to (52). We ini-
tially define these without reference to M . [[·]]M,P and M,P will be defined by
relativization to M , i.e., by restriction of quantified variables to M .
PROOF. We define [[σ]] by recursion on the complexity of σ. We begin with
the primitive sentences xˆ0∈xˆ1 and xˆ0=xˆ1, which we well-order as follows.
Recall that Ω is the class of ordinals. Let ≺ be the well-ordering of Ω ×
Ω
def
= {[α0, α1] | α0, α1 ∈ Ω} as follows:
[α0, α1] ≺ [β0, β1]
def
⇐⇒ max{α0, α1} < max{β0, β1}
or
(
max{α0, α1} = max{β0, β1}
& (min{α0, α1} < min{β0, β1}
or (min{α0, α1} = min{β0, β1}
& α0 < β0))
)
.
We define the rank r[x0, x1] of an ordered pair of sets to be the position of
[ρ(x0), ρ(x1)] in this ordering, where ρ(·) is the rank function of Def. 30; and
we define the rank r(σ) of a primitive sentence xˆ0∈xˆ1 or xˆ0=xˆ1 as r[x0, x1].
We observe that r[·, ·] is monotone increasing in (the rank of) each argument
separately, or, to put it in the form we will use, decreasing (the rank of) either
argument in an ordered pair decreases the value of the rank function. We also
observe that an unordered pair {α0, α1} gives rise either to one ordered pair, if
α0 = α1, or two ordered pairs, if α0 6= α1, such that r[α0, α1] and r[α1, α0] are
consecutive ordinals. It follows that decreasing (the rank of) either argument
in an ordered pair as above and then reversing its arguments also necessarily
decreases the value of the rank function. This is all we need to know about
r[·, ·] (in addition to its well-orderedness).
In the following discussion, ‘p’, ‘q’, ‘r’, and related variables range over P , and
p¯
def
= ⌈p⌉ (to reduce notational clutter). As we have assumed P is separative,
p¯ ∈ Reg P. We define
[[xˆ0∈xˆ1]] =
∨
[y,p]∈x1
(p¯ ∧ [[yˆ=xˆ0]]) (53)
[[xˆ0=xˆ1]] =

 ∧
[y,p]∈x0
(p¯→[[yˆ∈xˆ1]])

 ∧

 ∧
[y,p]∈x1
(p¯→[[yˆ∈xˆ0]])

 , (54)
where → is the boolean operation defined by (10). Since [y, p] ∈ x =⇒ ρ(y) <
ρ(x), we see that (53) and (54) define [[σ]] for a given primitive sentence σ in
terms of [[σ′]] for sentences σ′ of lower rank. [[σ]] is therefore uniquely defined
for all primitive σ by induction on the rank of σ.
Note that we do not have to specify the initial step of this recursion separately,
since it is given by the general formula as
[[0ˆ∈0ˆ]] =
∨
[y,p]∈0
(p¯ ∧ [[yˆ=0ˆ]]) = 0
[[0ˆ=0ˆ]] =

 ∧
[y,p]∈0
(p¯→[[yˆ∈0ˆ]])

 ∧

 ∧
[y,p]∈0
(p¯→[[yˆ∈0ˆ]])

= 1.
Note also that using the identity p¯ = [[p˜∈G]] we can rewrite the right side
of (53) as
∨
[y,p]∈x1 [[p˜∈G∧yˆ=xˆ0]], and the right side of (54) can be similarly
expressed. Thus (53) and (54) permit the reduction of any primitive formula
to an equivalent P -ary boolean expression applied to the basic formulas ǫp =
p˜∈G, i.e., an expression in LP in the sense of Section 4.2, with the same boolean
value—which is to say, given the proposition, having the same truth value
when interpreted in M [G] for any M-generic G. Note finally that since M is
assumed to be countable, this construction carried out “inM”, i.e., relativized
to M , identifies each primitive formula of LM,P with a Borel expression in LP.
Turning now to the proof of the proposition by induction, we note that there
is no need to treat the initial cases 0ˆ∈0ˆ and 0ˆ=0ˆ separately, as their proofs are
covered by the general case (the induction hypothesis being vacuous). Thus,
we suppose σ is xˆ0∈xˆ1 or xˆ0=xˆ1 and we suppose the proposition to be true
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for all primitive sentences with rank less than r[x0, x1]. We claim that it is
true for σ. We note that for all filters G
M[G] |= xˆ0∈xˆ1 ⇐⇒ x
G
0 ∈ x
G
1
M[G] |= xˆ0=xˆ1 ⇐⇒ x
G
0 = x
G
1 .
Note also that
((∃p ∈ G)p  σ) ⇐⇒ G ∩ [[σ]] 6= ∅.
We therefore claim that for all M-generic G
xG0 ∈ x
G
1 ⇐⇒ G ∩ [[xˆ0∈xˆ1]] 6= ∅ (55)
xG0 = x
G
1 ⇐⇒ G ∩ [[xˆ0=xˆ1]] 6= ∅. (56)
PROOF. [(55)] By the definition of ·G, xG0 ∈ x
G
1 iff there exists [y, p] ∈ x1
such that p ∈ G and yG = xG0 . Since [y, p] ∈ x1 =⇒ ρ(y) < ρ(x1), by the
induction hypothesis the left side of (55) is equivalent to
(∃[y, p] ∈ x1)(p ∈ G & G ∩ [[yˆ=xˆ0]] 6= ∅). (57)
By (53) the right side of (55) is equivalent to
(∃[y, p] ∈ x1)(∃p
′ ∈ G)(p′ ≤ p & p′ ∈ [[yˆ=xˆ0]]. (58)
Suppose (57) is true and that y and p witness this, i.e., [y, p] ∈ x1 & p ∈
G & G ∩ [[yˆ=xˆ0]] 6= ∅. Let p
′ be in G ∩ [[yˆ=xˆ0]], and let p
′′ be a common
extension of p and p′ in G, which must exist since G is a filter. Then p′′ ∈ p¯
and p′′ ∈ [[yˆ=xˆ0]] so by p
′′ ∈ [[xˆ0∈xˆ1]], so (58) is true.
Conversely, suppose y, p, and p′ witness (58). Then p ∈ G because p ≥ p′ ∈ G
(and G is a filter), and G ∩ [[xˆ0∈xˆ1]] contains p
′, so (57) is true. ✷[(55)]
Of note, the preceding argument does not require that G be M-generic, only
that it be a filter. The proof of (56) uses the genericity hypothesis.
PROOF. [(56)] We will prove (56) in its contrapositive form:
xG0 6= x
G
1 ⇐⇒ G ∩ [[xˆ0=xˆ1]] = ∅ (59)
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As before we use the definition of ·G and the induction hypothesis to write the
left side of (59) as
(∃[y, p] ∈ x0)(p ∈ G & G ∩ [[yˆ∈xˆ1]] = ∅)
or (∃[y, p] ∈ x1)(p ∈ G & G ∩ [[yˆ∈xˆ0]] = ∅)
(60)
Suppose (60) is true. Without loss of generality, suppose y and p witness the
first clause, so that [y, p] ∈ x1, p ∈ G, and G ∩ [[yˆ∈xˆ1]] = ∅. Then
G ∩ (p¯→[[yˆ∈xˆ1]]) = ∅. (61)
For suppose toward a contradiction that p′ ∈ G and p′ ∈ p¯→[[yˆ∈xˆ1]] = ∼p¯ ∨
[[yˆ∈xˆ1]], i.e., (∀q ≤ p
′)(∃r ≤ q)(r ∈ ∼p¯ or r ∈ [[yˆ∈xˆ1]]. Since G is M-generic,
there exists r ∈ G such that r ∈ ∼p¯ or r ∈ [[yˆ∈xˆ1]]. r cannot be in ∼p¯
because it is then incompatible with p, which contradicts G being a filter.
Hence r ∈ [[yˆ∈xˆ1]], which contradicts our assumption that y witnesses the first
clause of (60). (61) implies that G does not meet the right side of (54), so
G ∩ [[xˆ0=xˆ1]] = ∅, as claimed.
Conversely, suppose G ∩ [[xˆ0=xˆ1]] = ∅, i.e., G does not meet the right side
of (54). Since G is M-generic, it fails to meet p¯→[[yˆ∈xˆ1]] for some [y, p] ∈ x0
or p¯→[[yˆ∈xˆ0]] for some [y, p] ∈ x1. Suppose without loss of generality that
[y, p] ∈ x0 and G fails to meet p¯→[[yˆ∈xˆ1]] = ∼p¯∨ [[yˆ∈xˆ1]]. Since G isM-generic
and does not meet ∼p¯, it does meet p¯, so p ∈ G, and therefore yG ∈ xG0 . But
G does not meet [[yˆ∈xˆ1]], so by the induction hypothesis y
G /∈ xG1 . Therefore
xg0 6= x
G
1 , as claimed. ✷[(56]
This concludes the definition and proof for the sentences xˆ0∈xˆ1 and xˆ0=xˆ1.
There is one more type of primitive sentence, viz., M˜(xˆ), and we now let
[[M˜ (xˆ)]]
def
=
∨
a∈M
[[xˆ=a˜]]. (62)
The proposition for this case says that for any M-generic G, M[G] |= M˜(xˆ)
iff G ∩
∨
a∈M [[xˆ=a˜]] 6= ∅. Since G is M-generic, G ∩
∨
a∈M [[xˆ=a˜]] 6= ∅ iff
∃a ∈ M)G ∩ [[xˆ=a˜]] 6= ∅. We know by now that this is equivalent to (∃a ∈
M)M[G] |= xˆ=a˜, i.e., for some a ∈ M , xG = aˇG = a, which is to say,
M[G] |= M˜(xˆ).
We are finished with the primitive sentences. Now we define [[σ]] for complex
sentences σ by recursion on the complexity of σ, i.e., on the number of logical
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connectives and quantifiers in σ, in the natural way:
[[∼σ]] = ∼[[σ]]
[[σ0∧σ1]] = [[σ0]] ∧ [[σ1]]
[[σ0∨σ1]] = [[σ0]] ∨ [[σ1]]
[[σ0→σ1]] = [[σ0]]→[[σ1]]
[[σ0↔σ1]] = [[σ0]]↔[[σ1]]
[[∀u φ(u)]] =
∧
x∈M [[φ(xˆ)]]
[[∃u φ(u)]] =
∨
x∈M [[φ(xˆ)]].
(63)
The inductive proof of the proposition for complex sentences is straightforward
and is left as an exercise for the reader. ✷[Proposition 18]
Note that (53), (54), (62), and (63) make no mention of filters on P, and
they make perfect sense without any assumption about the existence of M-
generic filters. We may regard LM,P as referring to a boolean-valued structure—
specifically a Reg P-valued structure, which we call MReg P or simply MP. M
may be any class model of ZFA; in particular, M may be V , the class of all
sets, i.e., the set-theoretical universe. We call V P = V Reg P the Reg P-valued
universe.
The notion of an A-valued structure, where A is a complete BA, is a straight-
forward generalization of the usual notion of a structure S if we regard the
latter as a 2-valued operational structure S2, where 2 is the 2-element BA,
whose only elements are 0 and 1, i.e. false and true. It is sufficient for the
present purpose to consider structures appropriate to a given purely relational
language L. For each relation symbol R of L we let Rˆ be a distinct operation
symbol of the same rank. These are the operation symbols of S2. For each
relation symbol R we define
RˆS
2
(x0, . . . , xn−1)
def
=


1 if 〈x0, . . . , xn−1〉 ∈ R
S
0 if 〈x0, . . . , xn−1〉 /∈ R
S,
where n is the rank of R and Rˆ. To obtain an A-structure S for L we simply
replace 2 by A. S is defined by the interpretations of RˆS, which are |A|-valued
functions with arguments in |S|. The satisfaction operation for S, which we
denote by ‘[[·]]A’, gives a value in |A| for each formula φ(a0, . . . , an−1) of L with
parameters a0, . . . , an−1 ∈ |S|, and is defined in the natural way.
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The case of present interest is that A = Reg P and S is the class of terms xˆ
of the forcing language LM,P.
Definition 32 We say that a formula φ of LM,P with n free variables is valid
at 〈x0, . . . , xn−1〉 iff [[φ(xˆ0, . . . , xˆn−1)]]
Reg P = 1. A sentence in the language
of set theory (without the additional constants xˆ of the forcing language) is
Reg P-valid iff it is valid when regarded as a sentence of LV,P (there are no
free variables in σ to particularize).
We will not have need of the following two propositions, but they are of great
interest in their own right and provide an additional perspective on the results
of this paper. The proof of the first proposition is rather pedestrian and is left
as an exercise for the interested reader.
Proposition 20 For any separative partial order (SPO) P, the set of Reg P-
validities is deductively closed.
To prove this one of course needs a precise definition of the deducibility relation
⊢; all (classical ones) are equivalent, and any will do.
Proposition 21 If σ is an axiom of ZFA, then ZFA∪{P is a SPO, Set(P)} ⊢
[[σ]]Reg P = 1. Moreover, ZFCA ⊢ [[AC]]Reg P = 1.
The proof of this proposition is a bit more involved, albeit not particularly
difficult, but it (the proof, that is, not the proposition) provides no insight of
particular value for the purposes of this paper, so we will omit it.
As noted previously, (15),
[[G is a generic filter on Pˇ]]
Reg P
= 1.
What makes these propositions so useful is that P may be chosen in such a
way as to create many validities in addition to those just listed. The following
theorem shows how to use this capability to prove relative consistency results
in set theory.
Proposition 22 Suppose ZFA is consistent, σ is a sentence in the language
of ZFA and ZFA ⊢ ∃SP (P is a SPO and [[σ]]
Reg P = 1). Then ZFA ∪ {σ} is
consistent. The same holds as well for any of the theories ZF, ZFC, and ZFCA.
PROOF. Suppose toward a contradiction that ZFA∪{σ} is inconsistent, and
suppose that π is a proof of a contradiction, say θ∧∼θ, from ZFA∪ {σ}. Like
all proofs, π is finite and it makes use of only finitely many axioms of ZFA. 18
18 Although we have given the axioms of ZFA as a finite list, several members of the
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We construct a proof in ZFA as follows. We begin by giving a proof of
∃SP (P is a SPO and [[σ]]
Reg P = 1).
We then say ‘let P be such a SPO’, and we show that each of the axioms of ZFA
used in π is a Reg P-validity, which we know we can do by Prop. 21. We now
use Prop. 20 and the existence of π to infer that θ∧∼θ is a Reg P-validity,
i.e., [[θ∧∼θ]]Reg P = 1. But [[θ∧∼θ]]Reg P = [[θ]]Reg P ∧ ∼[[θ]]Reg P = 0. Hence,
∅ = 0Reg P = 1Reg P = |P|. But a partial order is by definition nonempty, so this
is a contradiction.
The existence of this proof (of a contradiction from ZFA) contradicts our
hypothesis that ZFA is consistent; and this contradiction establishes the un-
tenability of our supposition that ZFA ∪ {σ} is inconsistent. So ZFA ∪ {σ} is
consistent, as claimed. ✷
6.4 The ontology of hidden variables
We now have the means in hand to address definitively the issue of the exis-
tence of generic filters, which as we have seen is the crux of the hidden-variables
program for reductive propositional systems:
(1) One approach is to posit a countable transitive modelM of some suitable
fragment of ZFA—which may be taken to be finite, in which case the
existence of M is provable in ZFA. M may be taken large enough to
comprehend all structures of interest to us and all sets with respect to
which we want pseudoclassical states to be generic. As M is countable,
M-generic filters provably exist.
(2) A second approach is simply to suppose thatM-generic filters exist, even
though M may not be countable. The consistency of this supposition
is proved as outlined above. As we have previously noted, of course, an
M-generic filter cannot be in M except in trivial cases, so if M-generic
filters exist then M is not the entire universe V of sets.
(3) The third approach is to suppose that M = V and to treat generic filters
as having only a sort of potential existence. The statement ‘p  σ’, where
σ is a sentence of LM,P may now be interpreted informally as saying ‘if the
universe were larger than it is and there were a generic (i.e., V -generic)
filter G with p ∈ G, then σ would be true in V [G]’. As we have seen
above, this is an interesting notion—and the set of sentences with Reg P-
value 1 is an interesting theory—even if generic filters do not properly
exist. One conceptual advantage of this approach is that we do not have
list are schemas that have infinitely many instances.
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to qualify the term ‘generic’; a filter is generic iff it meets all dense sets,
not just those in some ad hoc collection.
We may tie the question of existence of generic filters in the mathematical
sense (which has to do with the existence axioms of set theory) more closely
to the question of physical existence of pseudoclassical states if, instead of
thinking of the set-theoretical world as something distinct from the physical
world, we regard the physical and mathematical worlds as one. This is not
a bizarre conceit; we are quite accustomed, for example, to treating certain
sets of (physical) atoms, with certain relations, as molecules; certain sets of
molecules as, say, biological organisms; certain sets of organisms as species,
etc.
As noted above, it is perfectly possible to develop a theory of sets that allows
for the existence of objects that are not sets, that we call for mathematical
purposes urelements or atoms. This is the theory ZFA that we have been
using above. We may therefore define V to be the set-theoretical universe
erected on a base consisting of purely physical entities as urelements. It is
even conceivable that the physical world is entirely set-theoretical, or—to put
it perhaps a bit more palatably—that the physical world is pure structure.
It is hard to imagine that anyone one conversant with historical trends in
physics could be confident that this is not so, but even if we adopted this
point of view we would still have a need for a sense of physical existence dis-
tinct from mathematical existence, the former implying the latter but not vice
versa. Thus, if pseudoclassical states in a given context then the correspond-
ing generic filters must exist, but not vice versa. As with all physical theories,
in practice the important question is that of utility: Do we get a more useful
theory by positing the existence of pseudoclassical states? The answer to this
question is almost surely ‘no’, even assuming that a proper quantum theory
can be constructed on this basis. (See Bohm[3,4] for an early attempt at this.)
Returning now to the three approaches to the existence of generic filters listed
above, we see that the first approach may be interpreted as saying that pseu-
doclassical states for countably many posable questions—viz., those in some
countable model M of ZFA—could physically exist, since the corresponding
generic filters mathematically exist. The hiddenness of these states lies in the
fact that their complete description is more complicated than any posable
question—is not in fact in M .
The second approach suggests that we regard M as containing the world of
quantum mechanics in the conventional sense, including all ordinary quantum
states and everything we can do with them, while pseudoclassical states reside
in the V \M . The hiddenness of these states is due to the fact that they are
not in the “ordinary” world.
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The third approach suggests that we think of physical pseudoclassical states
as having the same sort of potential as opposed to actual existence as the
V -generic filters that are their mathematical counterparts. To summarize the
main result of this paper in this context, let A = RegPR, where R is a re-
ductive propositional system consisting of observables of a physical system S.
Let V A be the A-valued universe erected over the physical world. Ordinary
statements in the theory of V with the additional unary predicate symbol ‘G’
may be interpreted in V A and have a value in A. The set TA of statements with
value 1 is the theory of V A. TA contains ‘G is a V -generic filter on PR’, and it
contains ‘f
˜
P
G
∈ [[T˜ ]]
ιˆ
’ for every ω-sequence P of commuting propositions in R
and every boolean expression T such that µPψ ([[T ]]
ι) = 1 for all nonzero ψ ∈ V
(i.e., every test of randomness), where ι is the standard interpretation σ 7→ Iσ
in the sense of V and ιˆ is the same thing in the sense of V A. In other words, G
may be regarded as (representing) the pseudoclassical state of S vis-a`-vis R,
and f
˜
P
G
—the sequence of values of 〈Pn | n ∈ ω〉 for G—looks for all the world
like a sequence generated according to the stochastic process (i.e., probability
measure) µPψ for any nonzero ψ.
This approach to the issue of hidden variables seems the most natural. It
makes no assumption about the existence of generic filters, either by imposing
a restriction—such as countability—on the set of “posable questions”, or by
supposing that the (actual) set-theoretical universe is a generic extension of
some subuniverse that contains all such questions. Of course, we sacrifice the
notion of a pseudoclassical state as a definite entity, but upon reflection this
appears as not so much a defect of the interpretation as an insight into the
natural status of hidden variables in the quantum theory.
A final word to dispel any doubt that may linger on the subject. Boolean-
valued logic (other than “classical” 2-valued logic) has appeared in this paper
only as an object of study, not as a mode of discourse. The theorems are all
2-valued, in fact {1}-valued.
A Logical and set-theoretic conventions
The essential relations of set theory are those of identity, denoted by ‘=’ or
‘is’, and membership, denoted by ‘∈’, ‘is in’, or ‘is a member of’. A class is any
entity whose identity is determined entirely by its members—in other words,
an object A is a class iff for any B, A = B ⇐⇒ (∀x)(x ∈ A ⇐⇒ x ∈ B). A
set is a class that is a member of some class. A class is proper iff it is not a set.
The necessity of distinguishing sets as special classes is most simply illustrated
by Russell’s paradox, which inquires whether the class A of all classes that are
not members of themselves is a member of itself. The resolution lies in noting
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that A is ill defined, as it cannot contain all classes that are not members of
themselves, but only those that are sets. If we so modify the definition then
we may conclude that A is not a member of itself and is therefore a proper
class. (In standard set theory, no set is a member of itself, so A = V , the class
of all sets.)
‘Set theory’ is used generically to refer to any mathematical theory of mem-
bership. In a pure class theory we assume that all objects are classes; in a pure
set theory we assume that all objects are sets. If we wish we may admit objects
that are not classes. In the context of set theory we call such objects atoms or
urelements. By definition they have no members. By convention, they are per-
mitted to be members of classes. (An entity that neither has nor is a member
(of anything) has no role in a theory of membership.) They are regarded for
set-theoretic purposes as primitive and devoid of intrinsic structure. All their
properties are attributable to their membership in various classes. An element
is either a set or an urelement; thus, it is something that can be a member of
a class.
Set theory with atoms subsumes ordinary mathematical practice and, indeed,
ordinary scientific practice. In chemistry, for example, we may regard (chemi-
cal) atoms as atoms (i.e., urelements). Chemical bonds may also be regarded
as urelements. A molecule is a set of atoms and bonds related in a certain
way, and so forth. Physical quantities may be regarded as primitive entities
with certain relations and operations; for example, there are physically defin-
able operations of addition for temperature, energy, and many other physical
quantities. The elaborate mathematical formalism of modern physics consists
of statements interpretable in a set-theoretical superstructure erected on top
of the physical world, as it were.
‘{· · ·}’ is used to denote a class with its members indicated in some fashion. For
example, {x, y} is the (unordered) pair of x and y and {x | φ(x)} is the class of
all elements x that satisfy the formula φ. [x, y]
def
= {x, {x, y}} 19 is the ordered
pair of x and y. Note that x and y must be elements in order that [x, y] exist,
and if x, y, x′, y′ are elements, then [x, y] = [x′, y′] ⇐⇒ (x = x′ & y = y′). A
binary relation is a class of ordered pairs. The domain domR and image imR
of a binary relation R are
domR
def
= {x | ∃y [x, y] ∈ R} (A.1)
19 ‘
def
= ’ is used to mean ‘is defined to be’, and ‘
def
⇐⇒ ’ is used to mean ‘is defined to
be true iff’, i.e., roughly, ‘is defined to mean’. ‘7→’ means ‘maps to’ and provides a
handy way of naming functions. For example, ‘x, y 7→ xy’ names the exponentiation
operation. A free variable may also be represented by a dot, so that, for example,
‘| · |’ has the same meaning as ‘x 7→ |x|’.
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imR
def
= {y | ∃x [x, y] ∈ R}. (A.2)
If R is a relation and X is a class, R→X
def
= {y | (∃x ∈ X)[x, y] ∈ R} is the
(forward) image of X under R, and R←X
def
= {x | (∃y ∈ X)[x, y] ∈ R} is the
inverse image of X under R.
A function is a binary relation F with the property that
(∀x ∈ domF )(∃!y)[x, y] ∈ F, (A.3)
where ‘∃!’ means ‘there exists a unique’. For x ∈ domF , F (x) is that element y
such that [x, y] ∈ F . If F is a function andX is a class, F→X = {F (x) | x ∈ X}
and F←X = {x ∈ domF | F (x) ∈ X}.
We will also find it convenient to name functions by expressions of the form
〈τ(x) | φ(x)〉
def
= {[x, τ(x)] | φ(x)}. (A.4)
where φ(x) is a formula, i.e., it is true or false depending on x, and τ(x) is a
term i.e., it denotes a element that is uniquely determined by x for all x such
that φ(x). φ and τ may have free variables other than x.
∅ is the empty set, i.e., the (unique) set with no members. We also use ‘0’ to
denote ∅. 1 is defined as {0}, 2 is {0, 1}, 3 is {0, 1, 2}, etc. In other words, the
natural numbers are defined in such a way that each natural number n is the
set of numbers that precede it (of which there are n). These are also referred to
as the finite ordinals. ω
def
= {0, 1, . . .} is the set of all finite ordinals. For n ∈ ω, a
sequence of length n or n-sequence or n-tuple is a function with domain n. Note
that if σ is an n-sequence then σ = 〈σ(m) | m ∈ n〉. We may also denote such a
sequence σ by indicating its elements as an explicit list between angle brackets.
Thus σ = 〈σ(0), σ(1), . . . , σ(n− 1)〉. Similarly, an ω-sequence—also called an
infinite sequence—is a function with domain ω, and we may indicate such a
sequence σ by ‘〈σ(0), σ(1), . . .〉’. Concatenation of finite sequences is defined
and indicated as follows: σaσ′ = 〈σ(0), . . . , σ(n − 1), σ′(0), . . . , σ′(n′ − 1)〉,
where σ and σ′ have length n and n′, respectively.
Note that 〈x, y〉 6= [x, y]. The former is
{
{0, {0, x}}, {1, {1, y}}
}
,
while the latter is
{x, {x, y}}.
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(A.4) stresses the view of a function as an indexed family of elements. We will
also have occasion for a single expression that denotes an indexed family of
classes in general (whether sets or proper classes). For this purpose we make
the following definition. If R is a binary relation and x is a element,
R(x)
def
= {y | [x, y] ∈ R}. (A.5)
Note that R(x) is defined for all x, even if x /∈ domR, in which case R(x) = ∅. If
C is a class and R is a binary relation then we may consider R as a C-indexed
family (of classes) if we agree that we will use only members of C as indices.
We represent this C-indexed family by
(R(x) | x ∈ C). (A.6)
Analogously to elements, we define a finite sequence of classes to be an n-
indexed family for a finite ordinal n. (), (a), (a, b), etc., are respectively 0-, 1-,
2-sequences, and so on. Note that (A.6) allows us to efficiently index families
that contain ∅ and families that do not. We use the notation ‘(· · ·)’ for an
n-indexed family, where n is a natural number and · · · is a list of n classes,
defining it to be the smallest class that serves the purpose. Thus, for example,
(X, Y, Z) = {[0, a] | a ∈ X} ∪ {[1, a] | a ∈ Y }
∪{[2, a] | a ∈ Z}.
It is perhaps a useful exercise to compare the three ways we have of forming
an “ordered pair”:
[x, y] = {x, {x, y}}
〈x, y〉= {[0, x], [1, y]} = {{0, {0, x}}, {1, {1, y}}}
= {{{ }, {{ }, x}}, {{{ }}, {{{ }}, y}}}
(x, y) = {[0, a] | a ∈ x} ∪ {[1, a] | a ∈ y}.
A general relation of rank n may be regarded as a class of n-tuples. (Note
that this imposes a distinction between a binary relation (a class of ordered
pairs) and a relation of rank 2 (a class of 2-tuples)—a distinction that we
would not wish to be required to maintain scrupulously.) For example, the
order relation < on the real number field R is the set of 2-tuples 〈x, y〉 with
x, y ∈ R and x < y. A general operation of rank n is a relation F of rank n+1
with the property that for all x1, . . . , xn there exists at most one x such that
〈x, x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ F , and we define F (x1, . . . , xn) to be this x if it exists.
A structure is, most simply, a class of individuals together with some relations
and operations on this class. For example, the field of real numbers may be
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regarded as a structure R = (R,+, ·), where R is the set of real numbers, and
+ and · are respectively the operations of addition and multiplication. Note
that we use the ‘(· · ·)’ method of indicating a sequence of classes, and we list
the class of individuals first. We refer to this class also as the universe or
domain of the structure. Given a structure S, we define |S| to be its domain.
Thus, in general, S = (|S|, . . .).
If A is a set and B is a class we define AB (read “B pre A”) to be the class of
all functions from A to B. In particular, for n ∈ ω, nB is the set of sequences
of members of B of length n, and ωB is the set of all infinite sequences from
B. We define <ωB to be
⋃
n∈ω
nB.
Definition 33 A partial order (PO) P is a structure P = (|P|,≤), where |P|
is a nonempty class and ≤ is a binary relation such that for all p, q, r ∈ |P|,
(1) p ≤ p,
(2) (p ≤ q & q ≤ p) =⇒ p = q, and
(3) (p ≤ q & q ≤ r) =⇒ p ≤ r.
Note that we have distinguished the PO P, which is a structure, from the class
|P| of its individuals, which is in general an arbitrary set. P is |P| together with
the relation ≤. This distinction is logically significant and is necessary in any
general discussion of structure. We often emphasize the relationship between
a structure S and its domain of individuals by writing ‘|S|’ for the latter. In
some instances, as in the case of a collection of sets viewed as a partial order
with ≤=⊆ for example, the relations and operations of a structure are defin-
able from the individuals, so specifying the domain of individuals is sufficient
to determine the structure. In such cases we frequently conflate a structure
with is domain of individuals, typically using the structure name without the
flanking |’s for the domain of individuals.
We say p extends q iff p ≤ q. Given X ⊆ |P|, we let
⌈X⌉
def
= {p ∈ |P| | (∃q ∈ X) p ≤ q}
⌊X⌋
def
= {p ∈ |P| | (∃q ∈ X) p ≥ q},
and we let ⌈p⌉ and ⌊p⌋ be respectively ⌈{p}⌉ and ⌊{p}⌋ for p ∈ |P|. p, q ∈ |P|
are compatible iff they have a common extension. p|q iff p is incompatible with
q. An antichain in P is a set of pairwise incompatible members of |P|. P has
the countable chain condition iff every antichain in P is countable.
A subset D of |P| is directed iff (∀p, q ∈ D)(∃r ∈ D)(r ≤ p & r ≤ q). A
filter is a directed set F that is closed upward, i.e., any member of |P| with
an extension in F is in F , or, equivalently, ⌊F ⌋ = F . We will usually refer
to directed sets as prefilters. Given a prefilter D, ⌊D⌋ is clearly the smallest
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filter that extends D. 20 Any p ∈ |P| imposes a condition on a directed set D,
viz., that p be in D and we often refer to the members of |P| in this context
as conditions.
A prefilter is maximal iff it is not properly included in any prefilter. Clearly,
a maximal prefilter is a filter.
Proposition 23 Any prefilter can be extended to a maximal filter.
PROOF. This follows from the axiom of choice in the form of Zorn’s lemma
and the observation that if F is a set of prefilters linearly ordered by ⊆ then⋃
F is a prefilter. ✷
Definition 34 A boolean algebra is a structure A = (|A|,∼,∨,∧, 1, 0) with
the following properties:
(1) 0 6= 1.
(2) For all P,Q,R ∈ |A|
P ∨ P = P, P ∧ P = P,
P ∨Q = Q ∨ P, P ∧Q = Q ∧ P,
P ∨ (Q ∨ R) = (P ∨Q) ∨ R,
P ∧ (Q ∧ R) = (P ∧Q) ∧ R,
(P ∨Q) ∧ R = (P ∧R) ∨ (Q ∧ R),
(P ∧Q) ∨ R = (P ∨ R) ∧ (Q ∨ R).
(3) For each P ∈ |A|, ∼P is the unique element of |A| such that
P ∨∼P = 1 and P ∧∼P = 0.
(4) For all P,Q ∈ |A|
∼(P ∨Q) = ∼P ∧∼Q and ∼(P ∧Q) = ∼P ∨∼Q.
We write ‘P −Q’ for ‘P ∧ (∼Q)’.
If A is a BA we let A− be the partial order defined by
(1) |A−| = |A| \ {0};
20 In set-theoretical practice there is usually no reason to deal with prefilters that
are not filters. Note, however, that if one PO P is properly included in another PO
P′, and D is a prefilter in P, then ⌊D⌋ in P′ may not be the same as in P. For this
technical reason, we find it convenient to work explicitly with prefilters.
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(2) ∀P,Q ∈ |A−| (P ≤ Q ⇐⇒ P = P ∧Q).
We define compatibility, filter, antichain, etc., for A in terms of the correspond-
ing notions for |A−| as a PO. In terms of ≤, the meet and join of P and Q are
respectively the greatest lower bound and the least upper bound of {P,Q}.
The following is easily proved.
Proposition 24 Suppose F is a filter on a BA A. Then the following are
equivalent:
(1) F is maximal.
(2) ∀P ∈ |A−| (P ∈ F or (∃Q ∈ F )P |Q).
(3) ∀P ∈ |A−| (P ∈ F or ∼P ∈ F ).
A maximal filter in a BA is also called an ultrafilter.
A boolean algebra A is complete iff if every subset of A has a greatest lower
bound, which we call the meet of the set. Every set in a complete boolean
algebra also has a least upper bound, which we call the join of the set.
A boolean algebra is countably complete iff every countable set of elements
has a meet (equivalently, a join) in the algebra.
Proposition 25 If a BA A is countably complete and satisfies the countable
chain condition then A is complete.
PROOF. The proof depends on the axiom of choice. On this assumption any
set can be put in one-one correspondence with a von Neumann cardinal, i.e.,
an ordinal κ such that there does not exist a function from any ordinal λ < κ
onto κ. We proceed by induction. Suppose joins exist for all sets of cardinality
less than κ, where κ is a cardinal, and suppose X = {xα | α ∈ κ} is a subset
of A. Let yα =
∨
{xβ | β ∈ α} for each α ∈ κ. The elements xα − yα, α ∈ κ,
are pairwise incompatible, so by the countable chain condition, only countably
many of them are nonzero, so the join of the corresponding yαs exists. This is
clearly the least upper bound of X . ✷
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